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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Introduction to the Problem
1. Current Epistemology
The discussion in current epistemology primarily concerns a lively debate between
externalism and internalism. Internalism, broadly speaking, is the view that in order to have
knowledge an agent must have access to one’s justificatory reasons. Their view is rooted in the
classical view of knowledge presented by Plato. For Plato, justification for some belief (the
reasons for why the belief is true), one’s holding of that belief, and that belief’s being true are all
necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for knowledge.1 Perhaps the primary motivation for
most internalists, in regards to their accepting a view which is heavily based on this classical
approach, is that the classical approach is meant to distinguish knowledge from mere opinion and
lucky guesses. Suppose Ted guesses that his friend Bob is at work but he has no reason for
thinking it. And suppose that it just so happens that Bob is at work. Should we say that Ted knew
it? Most would say “No.” We seem to just recognize that knowledge is something more than true
belief. Justification is meant to be the reason/s one has for thinking the given belief is true.
Externalism, once again in very general terms, denies that access to the reasons that make
a belief true is necessary for knowledge.2 Reliability, the main concern for most externalists,
means the process which produces the belief produces mostly true beliefs. So if the process
which produces the belief is reliable and the belief is true then the agent has knowledge.

1
Plato, “Meno,” in Ancient Greek Philosophy, edited by S. Marc Cohen, Paricia Curd, and C. D. C. Reeve
(IN, Hackett 2011) 264 97e-98a.
2

Although some externalists would maintain that such access may be necessary in some cases.
Nevertheless they hold that it is not necessary for all cases and this is enough to label them as externalists.
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Externalists are more varied in terms of what motivates their theories. Space does not permit us
to go into detail on these factors. The purpose of the paper is not an elaboration of the various
externalist views. However, a few examples may be helpful. Some externalists think that there
are many beliefs which we are rational in holding and have a right to claim as knowledge
without any justificatory reasons (e.g. belief in other minds or belief in God).3 Most think that for
some reason or other a belief’s being produced in a reliable manner is all that is needed.4
Perhaps the primary reason for this debate between internalism and externalism is due to
what is known as the Gettier problem. Gettier problems are cases where an agent has
justification, true belief, and the agent holds belief on account of the evidence available to the
agent, yet the beliefs being true has nothing to do with the agent’s justificatory reasons. 5 (The
Requirement for justification, true belief, and that belief’s being true is known as the tripartite
criterion for knowledge. Gettier problems seem to show that the traditional tripartite model of
knowledge fails to distinguish between lucky guesses and knowledge.) The internalists have
largely attempted to remedy the problem by specifying a fourth criteria which will serve to
differentiate between the two. Five decades, full of such attempts, have yet to provide a single
likely candidate. However, externalist positions have fared little better. Gettier problems can be
constructed for them as well. In these cases a belief is true and produced by reliable processes,
but the belief’s being true has nothing to do with the reliability of the process which generated

3

Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, (New York Oxford University Press, 2000), chapter 6.
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David Armstrong and Alvin Goldman are motivated by a materialist metaphysic to this conclusion. And
Plantinga holds this as well on the condition that the belief’s production, on top of being reliable, is a process which
is part of a design plan aimed at truth. See David Armstrong, “The Thermometer-Model of Knowledge,” in
Knowledge, ed. Sven Bernecker and Fred Dretske (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 72-85, Alvin Goldman,
“Discrimination and Knowledge,” in Knowledge, ed. Sven Bernecker and Fred Dretske (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2000), 86-102 and Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, 154ff.
5

Edmund Gettier, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” Analysis 23, no. 6 (1963) 121-123.
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the belief.6 Furthermore, externalists seem to still be have trouble dealing with Plato.7 The
likelihood of either side specifying the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge seems
to be low.
This thesis will introduce certain aspects in the thought of Edmund Husserl as a sort of
third option.8 Husserl’s work was centered on cognition in general and the possibility of
knowledge in particular. His detailed analysis of cognition has application to epistemology and
addresses in great depth an area which in the current discussion is often tertiary and shallow at
best. Little is said about what cognition essentially is in the current discussion, though much
might be assumed about it. Husserl’s work on the essence of cognition may provide insight into
how to move forward in the current discussion.
Furthermore, it is argued that in both internalist and externalist camps there is a common
assumption about cognition which Husserl argues forcibly against. This assumption is that
thought, or cognition, is essentially linguistic. (The notion that ‘thought is essentially linguistic’

6
For a nice discussion and some examples of this see: Linda Zagzebski, “The Inescapability of Gettier
Problems,” The Philosophical Quarterly vol. 44 no. 174 (1994), 65–73.
7

Plato seems to show us that we need reasons. If Ted believes that his friend Bob is currently at work
because he usually works at this time, and Bob really is at work, this still seems like a lucky guess. The ‘usually’
here denotes a probability (we can assign whatever value we want to it, e.g. .5<, or .75<. And most of us seem to
want to say that such guesses are not knowledge. But what is the difference in this case and a case where belief
forming mechanism X causes Bob to believe that Ted is at work and this mechanism has a probability of producing
a true belief greater than .5 or .75? There seems to be a need for something more than probability or likelihood here.
8

In what sense Husserl is a third option will be clarified later but a brief explanation may be helpful here.
Let us call the set of Internalist approaches I and the set of Externalist approaches E. Husserl’s work, strictly
speaking, is on cognition not epistemology. Thus the argument is not for H, a Husserlian approach to epistemic
issues, in distinction from I and E. But rather that by starting with a Husserlian view of cognition we wind up with a
range of approaches to epistemic issues. Let us call these I’ and E’. Husserl does not force us into a specific view or
even a specific camp, e.g. I or I’ only. It should also be pointed out that some views within E or I might be entirely
excluded from E’ or I’. An externalist view such as Goldman’s which seeks to naturalize epistemology, hence
requiring a materialistic view of cognition, will not work with a Husserlian view of cognition. Again due to the
limitations on this thesis exactly what theories can be combined with a Husserlian approach to cognition and which
ones cannot is something which lies outside the scope of this paper. All of this shows that this “third approach” is
more like a new foundation which allows for many new approaches which to some extent mirror the current “two
approaches.”
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means that thought requires the use of language.) Whatever else thinking may be, when we do it
we do it in or with language. This assumption about thought means that whatever justification
may be it is linguistic (that justification involves clear and effable propositions).9 This thesis
holds that the rejecting of this assumption is critical to advancing the discussion past the current
stalemate.
In order to provide a foundation for the two points above, i.e. that Husserlian insights into
cognition itself are needed and that the assumption of thought as being linguistic ought to be
rejected, we need to understand Husserl’s own theory. This launches us into the field of
phenomenology.
2. Phenomenology
One of the reasons this thesis is needed is that Husserl’s work is largely considered to be
in another field of philosophy. His phenomenology, the rigorous science he developed of
investigating cognition and its parts and structure, has largely been insulated from contemporary
discussion in the various areas of philosophy, outside of those publications and authors who
specialize in Husserl and Phenomenology. As Dallas Willard, an expert on Husserl, points out
the significance of Husserl’s Logical Investigations, the central piece in Husserl’s work, is
entirely disconnected from and neglected by the work of the “trendsetters” in each area of
philosophy, including epistemology, and the only real concern about it is in the form of
“someone, surely, ought to know something about Husserl and his writings.”10 This insulation

9

What it means for a proposition to be effable and clear might be relative to the person and subject to
variation. There may also be a sort of translation problem when offering one’s thoughts to another. All of this is
consistent with what is meant by ‘clear and effable). The assumption holds that (regardless of what communication
problems there maybe) what is going on in the mind of the knower is linguistic in nature. To see this assumption
explicitly stated in the works of several philosophers and a fuller treatment of it see Dallas Willard, “The Absurdity
of ‘Thinking in Language’,” The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy IV(1973) 125-132.
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has resulted in a general disinterest of Husserl and an attitude which sees his work as irrelevant
to current issues. Husserl’s work is voluminous and complex. His terminology differs from what
has become typical in most journals and papers. But his work is dealing with the same
fundamental questions.
There has also been a bias in recent epistemology to neglect Husserl because of historical
reasons. Logical Positivism and its emphasis on language became the dominate force in
philosophy at the turn of the 20th century. Few would consider themselves logical positivists now
but much of the underlying approach to philosophy that logical positivism embodied has largely
been unquestioned. This approach is heavily devoted to language and the process of explanation.
The process of explanation is the listing of necessary and sufficient conditions for something and
the postulating of entities to explain some relevant fact (the author thinks that examples of both
of these in current epistemology are quite readily available, indeed the whole of Gettier problems
centers on difficulties in listing the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge). These
historical points are important to the current discussion. They have contributed to the assumption
that thought is linguistic, that we must adopt an explanative approach, and they require us to
devote a significant amount of space just to understanding Husserl and his phenomenological
approach.
Dallas Willard specialized in Husserl’s early work. Much of his philosophical work
concerned arguing for the importance of Husserl’s work and advancing a specific understanding
of Husserl. Willard took a view of Husserl which lies outside the typical views of most
interpreters. Willard saw Husserl’s work holistically. Most interpreters see Husserl’s later work

Dallas Willard, “The Significance of Husserl's Logical Investigations,”(paper presented at The Society
for the Study of Husserl's Philosophy at the APA meetings in Albuquerque, April 7, 2000), § 1. Available at
http://www.dwillard.org/articles/artview.asp?artID=60
10
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as being a form of idealism which rejected his earlier realist views. On Willard’s side though
stands Husserl himself, who claimed he never reverted to idealism.11
Willard provides us with a contemporary voice speaking for Husserl.
Furthermore, Willard’s overall epistemology has not been researched and discussed and
his own work has yet to be synthesized in with the current discussion. This paper is also an
attempt to bring Willard’s work into the discussion. However, it should be noted that Willard
was a thoroughgoing Husserlian. His view was the view that he took Husserl to have developed.
Gregg Ten Elshof, a former PhD student of Willard’s, writes: “He (Willard) loved to think,
write, and talk about a philosopher by the name of Edmund Husserl. He saw in Husserl a few
crucial insights required to make sense of our ability to have knowledge of the world.”12 Willard
himself once said “In my view, Husserl had resolved in principle all of the issues about the
possibility of knowledge in the sense of epistemic realism by the time he finished the Logical
Investigations.”13 Therefore, much of the development in this paper concerning Husserl’s view
also serves as an elaboration of Willard’s view. Because of this little distinction is made
throughout the piece between Husserl’s view and Willard’s. The approach is thus best termed a
Husserlian-Willardarian approach to knowledge.

Edith Stein, who worked for a while as Husserl’s assistant, notes that many of Husserl’s students after
Ideas was released felt that Husserl had slipped into idealism. Stein notes that Husserl himself tried to “dispel their
misgivings.” This shows how long running and deep the debate is concerning some of Husserl’s work and that
Husserl himself is at least on Willard’s side. See Edith Stein, Collected Works of Edith Stein Vol. 1 (Washington
DC: Washington Province of Discalced Carmelites, 1986), 250 (Found in Greg Jesson “The Husserlian Roots of
Dallas Willard’s Philosophical and Religious Works,” Philosophia Christi Vol. 16 No1 (2014), 15-16.
11

12

Gregg Ten Elshof, “On Dallas Willard, Husserl and the Perennial Problem,” EPS blog.

Dallas Willard, “The World Well Won: Husserl's Epistemic Realism One Hundred Years Later,” in
One Hundred Years of Phenomenology, edited by Dan Zahavi and F. Stjernfelt, (Kluwer Academic Publishers,
Dordrecht, 2002), 69.
13
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B. Statement of Purpose and Limitations
The aim of this piece is not to try to enlist the philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Dallas
Willard in order to settle the great debate currently being waged in epistemology and declare
either externalism or internalism or any other of the various competing views a winner. Rather,
the aim is to try and explicate Husserl’s insights and to encourage the continuation of the
discussion along lines which utilize those insights. The general aim is to show that a detailed
analysis and application of a Husserlian-Willardarian (HW) approach to cognition offers a
potential way forward in the current discussion.
This progress hinges on Husserl and Willard’s uniform rejection of making language
central to the discussion and thought itself. If thought is essentially linguistic then one’s
justificatory reasons must be linguistic. Therefore, access to those reasons must be essentially
linguistic as well.14 The whole discussion then between whether this access is necessary or not
for knowledge is undermined if we reject the initial antecedent, the one that held that thought is
essentially linguistic. Husserl gives us a theory of cognition which is not essentially linguistic.
His theory of cognition in general and his work concerning the possibility of knowledge in
particular must both be made clear. The clarification of those two are the focal points of chapters
two and three. Chapter four shows that, despite the assumption of many, HW is compatible with
certain aspects of externalism.
1. Limitations Concerning Current Epistemology
The current discussion is highly nuanced and voluminous. Any real overview or
development of current epistemology or even of the externalism-internalism debate far exceeds

14

The whole issue of justification is certainly central to the current discussion and therefore language is
too. For justification involves thought and all thought (it is assumed) involves language.
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the scope and space of this paper. It should be understood that a tremendous amount of nuancing
is available concerning internalism, externalism, the terms ‘justification,’ ‘reliable’, etc. What is
offered here is a very broad approach to these views. But this should be accurate enough for our
purposes. Our purpose is to show that if one were to reject the assumption which they all share
(i.e. that thought and hence justification are essentially linguistic), then a new direction to
approaching these old problems opens up.
Discussions on Gettier problems, virtue epistemology, and many other areas are again
outside the scope of this paper. The HW approach developed certainly has implications for these
issues. But that application should and will be left for subsequent research. Again the thesis is
that HW provides a new way of looking at these issues, which offers us a more optimistic way of
addressing them. But the addressing of these current issues is not part of this paper.
It is recognized in general that there is a recognized stalemate between internalism and
externalism. The thesis presented here argues that HW is compatible with aspects of each of
these theories, but the application of HW to these theories or an in-depth analysis of what areas
of each theory are, or are not, compatible with HW is far too lengthy for this paper. In current
epistemology there are theories and there are “insights” (i.e. claims, often commonsensical
which we find hard to deny), about what we should and should not count as knowledge, which
drive those theories.15 Again, broadly speaking, the insights which drive internalists are the
classical insights attested to by Plato, (i.e. they revolve around the distinction between
knowledge and lucky guesses). The externalist insights revolve around beliefs which we are
rational in holding and for which we do not and need not offer evidence, provided the world is

‘Data’ would be somewhat similar to what I mean here by ‘insights’. However I have used ‘insights’ for
the following reasons. There is more disagreement concerning these “insights” than what is typical in situations
where ‘data’ is used. Also these “insights” are often the result of much hard work and lengthy discussion.
15
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working properly. This thesis concerns the indicated insights, the motivational factors behind the
theories, rather than the actual theories which attempt to account for them. In applying the work
developed here to the current discussion we would move back up to the level of working with
theories and out of the confines of this paper. In this way this paper concerns what could be
called meta-epistemology.16
2. Limitations Concerning Phenomenology
Husserl’s work is large, complex, and very little of it escapes dispute even among
Husserlian specialists.17 The view that is being applied to the current discussion though is a
Husserlian-Willardarian one. Willard was an expert on Husserl and forcefully argued for a
specific understanding of Husserl. This thesis does not argue that the view presented is Husserl’s
own, though the author thinks this historical claim is correct. The thesis simply claims that the
view presented has a strong case going for it in terms of whether it is true or not and that it has
much potential in regards to the current discussion. By labelling this view ‘HusserlianWillardarian’ it allows us to avoid detailed discussions in Husserlian scholarship that would
exponentially expand and deter from the goal. This provides the basis for the lack of discussion
concerning Willard’s somewhat unique view of Husserl which disagrees with many other
Husserlian specialists. It is one thing for us to ask whether Willard’s interpretation of Husserl is
correct. This is a historical and exegetical question. And it is another question for us to ask if
Willard’s interpretation of Husserl’s theory is a viable option with application to current
epistemology.

16
It seems to me that any work which is as concerned with theorizing about cognition as this work is it will
inevitably fall into this meta category, e.g. much of Kant’s work would be on this meta level.

There has been a long history of debate about Husserl’s own view, which goes as far back as one of his
very own and very early students, Martin Heidegger.
17
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Willard and his work, though, stand in a different relation to this paper than do Husserl
and his work. Because, what is being promoted is not Husserl’s view but Willard’s interpretation
of it. If there are misunderstandings about what Willard said in regards to Husserl’s theory then
this would be in opposition to the claims provided here. In other words if one were to disagree
about what Husserl meant when he said something, that does not concern us. However, if one
were to disagree about what Willard meant when he said something concerning Husserl then that
would concern us. So while this is not strictly speaking an exegesis of Husserl, it is an exegesis
of Willard. While much of the early work in this paper may seem like an exegesis of Husserl, it
should be remembered that it is an exegesis of a certain understanding of Husserl. Willard,
throughout his career, forcefully developed and expanded upon this understanding of Husserl.
Willard developed his own theory by arguing for Husserl’s. An exegesis of Willard then must
rest heavily on reading Husserl.18 This Willardarian interpretation of Husserl is our concern.
Many of the references selected from Husserl’s vast corpus are chosen with that in mind. Hence
our thesis centers on a Husserlian-Willardarian approach to knowledge.
C. Overview
1. Chapter Two: Phenomenology
Chapter 2 begins our discussion of phenomenology. One aspect which is often
overlooked in Husserlian studies is his early work. This early period of Husserl, roughly
speaking his work before the Logical Investigations, was the area of Willard’s expertise. His
view was that Husserl’s later work should be understood in light of his early work. This paper

18

There may be a similar situation when discussing the theories of certain medieval philosophers who,
while contributing to the field, largely did so by way of commentary on, for example, Plato.
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adopts the same approach, again contributing to the lack of emphasis on Husserl’s later works,
e.g. Ideas.
We begin by investigating the problems of mathematical knowledge which Husserl
himself started with in the early 1890’s. The focus is on Husserl’s insight into the type of
symbolic thought which characterized mathematics and which he later realized extended to all
thought in general. Husserl’s emphasis was on the possibility of knowledge. This emphasis
focuses on questions concerning what sort of operations a subjective mind would have to
perform in order to reach an objective world and what sort of investigative procedures are
appropriate for answering such questions.
Before investigating the specifics of Husserl’s theory of cognition we must understand
his approach concerning how one must address cognition. This leads us to a discussion of
Husserl’s science of cognition, phenomenology. Phenomenology in this sense concerns an
investigative methodology, not a specific theory. In order to understand Husserl’s claims about
knowledge one must first understand his methodology in addressing those claims.
The beginning of our discussion concerns Husserl’s claim that the mind does grasp, get
at, know, reality and that to think otherwise is a contradiction. This does not mean that we have
knowledge of the whole external world, though. It only means that there is something which the
mind can grasp. Husserl is a direct realist, but many more steps are needed before it can be
affirmed that we have knowledge of the external world in any way that would include things like
balls, chairs, cars, etc. Husserl’s transcendental reduction must first be analyzed in order to find
out if we can get at the external world. The transcendental reduction focuses us on the acts of
cognition and their parts and relations. It treats the “truthfulness” or “accuracy” of the images,
sense data, and various other parts of cognition, with indifference. Rather than using these parts

12

to get at the world, the reduction attempts to simply analyze them (i.e. to get clear on what they
are and what they are doing). The first step laid out for investigation into cognition regards our
getting clear concerning what is meant by ‘immanence’ and ‘transcendence.’ These terms are
explained in both their epistemological and ontological contexts. And the second reduction,
eidetic reduction, is explained as the means by which epistemological immanence is achieved.
At the heart of epistemological immanence lies the distinction between Aufklarung and
Erklarung. Aufklarung is understood as a kind of clarification that does not rest on premises or
use argumentation. It concerns the mind’s removing of ambiguities in regards to what it is
looking at. Erklarung is viewed as a kind of explanation. It uses argumentation and hence
necessarily premises as well. The whole investigative process of the physical sciences is a type
of explanation. Much of philosophy is also an explanatory process. It is argued that in order to
comprehend the possibility of knowledge, all premises must be excluded and therefore the
process of clarification, simply seeing what is going on, must be adopted. In closing it is argued
that the clarification process yields inspectable universals and some objections to this claim are
discussed.
2. Chapter Three: Knowledge
Chapter three applies the phenomenological method developed in chapter two and
provides us with an explication of knowledge along Husserlian-Willardarian lines. Having
worked through the reductions in the previous chapter it is now determined what acts of
cognition and what relations within those acts still remain for investigation. First a discussion
concerning intentionality is given. In a HW approach the mind is intentionality. That is to say the
mind does not possess intentionality as a property but the mind simply is active intentionality.
Therefore, the discussion of intentionality cannot be left aside.

13

We begin by pointing out the major difference between Husserl and both Brentano and
Frege. The latter two both begin by stipulating some problem, e.g. how can we intend objects
which do not exist, and then trying to propose the necessary and sufficient conditions for the
solution to the problem. Both of these approaches are also heavily focused on intentional objects.
Husserl’s starting approach is quite different. Husserl’s approach to understanding intentionality
treats intentional objects with indifference, regarding whether they exist or not. It is argued that
Husserl focuses on trying to gain clarity through the phenomenological method of the acts and
relations involved in intentionality.
The first aspect of intentionality investigated is the noetic. The noetic process concerns
the structuring of information which is presented to it. A stream of sensory data is not sufficient
(nor even necessary!) for intentionality. There must be a structuring process involved which
operates off of, in our case, hyle, or sensory data. The noetic process turns this raw data into
something meaningful, it sees the data as being something.19 This structuring process is the
function of noesis. Noesis, it is explained, is the foundation for having a single unified
experience which is necessary for intentionality, and hence knowledge.
The second aspect dealt with is the noematic component of intentionality. The noematic
aspect emerges from the prior noetic activity and it specifically concerns the object as it is
thought to be. This “as the object is thought to be” is itself an object, referred to as Noemata. It is
argued that Willard helps us to avoid error by rejecting a common assumption in Husserlian
interpreters, i.e. that if the noema is an object then it is the object of the mental act. The relation
to noema and the intentional object, the relation between, the hyletic, noetic, and noematic are

19

Cases of visual agnosia are cases where the noetic structuring process is not working properly. See Oliver
Sacks, The Man Who Mistook his Wife for a Hat and Other Clinical Tales, (New York: Summit Books, 1985).
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explained by example of a white ball under various coloured lights. It is explained that noematic
intentionality is a supplement to and not a replacement for noetic intentionality.20
Next it is explained how the essence of a mental act must contain its intentional
direction. The intentional direction is simply what an act is about. ‘Direction’ is used as opposed
to ‘object’ because in Husserl’s view a mental act can be about something that does not exist. If
‘object’ was used then it would be hard to make sense of how a mental act as a whole is about
something which does not exist. The essence of any intentional direction is not contained in any
act. This is seen because many thoughts, mental acts, can be about the same thing. So part of the
essence of an act, what makes it that particular act, is that it has that particular intentional
direction. But the essence of any intentional direction, what makes it about X as opposed to Y, is
not part of any particular act. Husserl’s careful work here is what allows for an act to be what it
is because of what it is about without transforming what it is about into being a part of the act.
This serves as the basis for showing that a mental act which can be drawn into
epistemological immanence has two different parts, ontologically immanent parts and an
ontologically transcendent part. The ontologically immanent parts are what makes it that act.
They are part of its essence. The ontologically transcendent part, which is the essence of the
intentional direction, is a universal. It is a universal since it can be a part of many different acts
and it is part of the act but not part of the act’s essence. This serves as the bridge between the
subjective and the objective.
With all these points in mind we are then equipped to turn to HW’s approach to what
knowledge is. After a reminder that the objects of consciousness can be given in one of two

Husserl’s work on the noetic and noematic aspects of cognition are his most difficult and debated
sections. They are the focal points of Husserlian interpreters. Summarizing them is quiet difficult. If the work here is
not entirely clear the author apologizes and recommends turning to Chapter III: A §2a.
20
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ways, authentically or symbolically, it is argued that knowledge is the process of seeing a
symbolic act pass over into an authentic act, this is the process of fulfillment. It is thus a higher
order act of cognition which relates two other acts in a specific way.
In closing, a comparison to Kant is given. It is argued that Kant’s work in ethics took a
similar approach to Husserl’s analysis of cognition. Kant started with an analysis of what is
necessary for something to be possible before analyzing it in a given situation (for example,
analyzing the necessary conditions for morality before analyzing its application to humans.). It is
argued that Kant’s failure in his own work regarding cognition largely concerned his abandoning
this approach.

3. Chapter Four: Husserl, Willard, and the Current Discussion
Chapter four concerns the approach to applying HW to the current discussion. Its main
emphasis is on showing that, contrary to popular opinion, HW is open to certain insights from
externalism. HW is normally seen as a type of internalism in the classical sense explained above.
It needs to be remembered that this thesis argues that, because of its very different approach to
cognition, it is neither a classic internalist view nor is it externalist either. Again the key to all of
this is the assumption, rejected by HW but accepted by both internalists and externalists, that
thought is linguistic.
The beginning of the chapter contrasts the traditional definitional approach to
epistemology, which is characterized by an attempt to provide the necessary and sufficient
conditions for knowledge, and a HW approach. The HW approach does not hold that a complete
list of the noetic conditions for knowledge are possible. This shows that HW takes an approach
significantly different from most current positions. It is then argued that in rejecting the idea of
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defining specific normative conditions for knowledge HW has something in common with
reformed epistemology. The question is then raised as to whether HW is compatible with
externalist features which are found in reformed epistemology. Reformed epistemology is used
in this chapter as a type of test case for HW to see if it is compatible with aspects of externalism.
Since it is widely accepted that Husserl’s theory, and by association Willard’s as well, is an
internalist theory there is no attempt to show that it is compatible with internalist lines of thought
in epistemology. However, if HW is meant to provide a new way forward, a hopeful avenue to
reconciling internalist and externalist notions, then it must be shown that HW is compatible with
aspects of both sides of the discussion.
Again the rejection of a lingocentric model of cognition and adoption of a Husserlian
model is the solution to reconciling HW with certain externalist features and the key to moving
forward in the current discussion. Two interrelated arguments are offered for why this rejection
is the solution and key. The first explicitly attacks the lingocentric model and attempts to clarify
HW’s position. This shows that the supposed irreconcilability between HW and externalist
notions or insights rests on the faulty assumption (i.e. the assumption that thought is linguistic).
The second argument attempts something more substantial. It first argues against certain
Heideggerian interpretations of Husserl, i.e. that Husserl’s belief that all cognition is intentional
commits him to a very strong form of internalism. It is then argued that while cognition is
essentially intentional both Husserl and Willard have argued for types of subordinate awareness
with a corresponding subordinate intentionality. In brief the subordinate intentions are ones that
we are less aware of. These subordinate aspects of cognition allow for the rejection of the strong
internalism which Heidegger’s interpretation imposes on Husserl. Next an attempt to further
explicate this subordinate intentionality in light of the current discussion is given. The idea of an
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intentionality threshold is developed and shown to distinguish between these subordinate and
primary aspects of intentionality. It is argued that the setting of the threshold is intentional. So
whether some intentional aspect is one which an agent is highly aware of or one which they are
not is the result of a previous intention (here one may read choice). This maintains the Husserlian
claim that cognition is essentially intentional. It is also argued that there is a normative aspect to
the setting of the threshold, which is to say it can be set rightly or wrongly. It is not argued in
detail how the threshold ought to be set but rather that one’s view of how it ought to be set will
make one more or less internalist in their theory.

4. Chapter Five: Closing
The final chapter summarizes the main points of the paper and attempts to give a very
precursory view into what lies ahead. It is argued that HW does not settle the current debate or
cause us to start the discussion all over again. However, it does give us a new starting point and
approach to the old problems. A standpoint which is more optimistic.
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II. Phenomenology
A. Introduction
Phenomenology has a history full of disagreement concerning its meaning, use and role.
This disagreement goes as far back as the misunderstanding between Husserl and his very own
student Martin Heidegger. In looking specifically at Husserl’s development of phenomenology
the problem of gaining clarity is increased by his voluminous output and continued disagreement
concerning his own position. The approach to and application of phenomenology in this paper
rests heavily on the work of Dallas Willard. Willard was a well-recognized Husserlian expert and
his own theory of knowledge was purposefully and closely aligned with Husserl’s. Willard not
only defended and explicated Husserl’s theory but he also applied Husserl’s theory to
contemporary epistemological issues.21 Willard thus serves as both a guide and a notable
contributor in his own right. Thus, the area of phenomenology under development here may
accurately be termed a Husserlian-Willardarian phenomenology of knowledge.
B. Phenomenology: An Historical Development
In many respects (contra to current assumptions which relegates phenomenology off to its
own separate corner) the field of philosophy is the same as that of phenomenology. In ways that
will be clarified, the task of Husserl’s phenomenology (specifically his transcendental reduction)
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was to exclude particulars and practical concerns and to focus on “the whole of things.”22
Aristotle differentiates first philosophy, or metaphysics, from the study of individual beings to
that of the study of being as being. Likewise, Husserl attempted to explicate the intellectual
process that goes on in nous (to use a classical term) as opposed to what goes on in individual
minds. Robert Sokolowski notes the connection between Aristotle and Husserl as both being
theoria tes aletheias (theory of truth) and calls Aristotle’s a ta meta ta physika (beyond the
physical) and Husserl’s a ta meta ta psychika (beyond the psychical).23 Aristotle focuses his
philosophy on substance, contrasting his philosophy against the lesser field of physics and the
study of particular substances. Husserl focuses his philosophy on mind, specifically its relation to
truth.
In understanding Husserl it is best to follow the example of Willard and seek to first
understand Husserl’s early work (beginning with his early work in mathematics). Willard notes
that what originally piqued the interest of Husserl was his endeavor to explain the reasoning
processes of mathematics. Husserl sought the means by which the mind of the mathematician
was directed to truths concerning numbers and number relations.24 Husserl recognized that
mathematics (the long standing paradigm of objective knowledge) had a rigorous and lawful
order to it which allowed the mathematician to have a clear understanding and nearly indubitable
knowledge of mathematical truths.25 What Husserl came to realize though is that the
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mathematician arrived at this knowledge by means of “a mere rule-governed manipulation of
sense perceptible symbols.”26 What is important here is that what is being used and what the
mind is focusing on in the process of even simple mathematical operations (like addition or
multiplication) are not numbers themselves, specific numerical concepts, but symbols.
“(Calculating) is not an activity with concepts, but rather with signs.”27 Numbers and number
relations are the foci of study early on for Husserl but ‘concept’ can include any substance,
essence, relation, property, etc., that thought can be directed toward.
Now concepts can come before our minds in one of two ways: Authentically, where the
concept itself is present to the mind, or inauthentically, where the concept is represented by
something else which is authentically given, i.e. a symbol.28 It might be held that simple
numbers, say 0-9 or so (even simple relations between numbers, e.g. that 2 is twice that of 1)
may be intuited and perhaps even authentically given. However, as the numbers get larger and
the relations more and more complex (e.g. the number 926,536 or the relation between it and
1,389,804) this becomes impossible. The mathematician then in order to find a specific concept
focuses entirely on things which lie outside of the concepts themselves, symbols. So to find the
number one and half that of 926,536 one does not focus on the concept behind the symbol
‘926,536’ and on the concept “one-and-a-half.” Rather, one focuses on a set of symbols arranged
in a pattern, both of which are determined by historical and cultural influences, manipulates
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those symbols according to set rules, then writes a new symbol, ‘1,389,804’, and is then directed
by that symbol to the proper concept.
Husserl, having established this “epistemic progression” then sought the answer to the
question: What are the mental processes and their order and relations which allows for this
symbolic thinking, thinking focused entirely on things other than numbers and their relations,
“that nevertheless allows those processes to eventuate in a grasp of truths about numbers and
number relations”?29 Husserl then realized that this problem of symbolic thinking was not
limited to mathematics alone. In the long running philosophical tradition it is not the things
themselves (objects, i.e. the ding en sich or die Sachen selbst in Husserl’s terms) which enter into
our subjective minds and with which we are acquainted. Rather, we interact with images, or
mental symbols, of those things. Aristotle himself pointed out “It is not the stone which enters
the soul.”30 Willard describes this shift in thinking which provided the starting point and the goal
for Husserl’s latter work:
(Husserl) therefore found himself involved in a more general
epistemological inquiry concerning how ordinary as well as scientific thinking —
both of which largely deal in highly partial or extrinsic determinations, or even
mere symbols, of the subject matters at issue, instead of with the matters
themselves — nevertheless can result in an accurate grasp of truths about die
Sachen selbst, and in many cases even a grasp of those very things themselves?
What are the laws of cognitive experience that account for this? It is in this form
that the problem of the objectivity of cognitive experience in general first
addressed itself to Husserl.31
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This emphasis on the subject-object gap represents a further development in Husserl’s
thought. The symbolic problem that has been under discussion can be seen as a subset of the
subject-object problem. The problem that Husserl now focuses on is how can any form of
thought or cognition, symbolic or otherwise, reach something objective.32 Husserl maintained
that we do in fact know things and that this knowing relation between the subject and the thing
known is something objective. That is to say that “there is an objective difference between one
who has knowledge of something and one who does not.”33 This follows the paradigm set up in
considering mathematical knowledge. It is commonly conceded that the answers to mathematical
questions are right or wrong, that there is an objectivity about them. However, the use and
manipulation of symbols is subjective, for they are part of our mental experiences. And mental
experiences are unique and non-repeatable, even within the mental life of the selfsame person.34
Furthermore, there seems to be no reason to hold that mental experiences (of any sort) have any
existential import. Mental experiences seem to remain shut off from the objective realm (hence
skeptical and epistemological questions in the first place).
This subjective element is perhaps harder to see in mathematical inquiry as opposed to
other inquiries, e.g. about colour. The two inquiries, of colour and number are quite similar
though (apart from the fact that the objectivity of the former is much more disputed than the
latter). There just is no guarantee that what you see as being the colour red matches with my
image of red or that what you see as being the number two or an addition sign matches with my
experience of them. In the case of numbers this difficulty is disregarded due to the fact that we
32
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commonly accept ‘2’ or ‘II” as being symbols. But this disregarded difficulty is of great
importance and it returns us to the problem which faced Husserl: How does the use and
manipulation of symbols lead to a grasp of the objective non-symbolic things themselves? Any
system which allows for the possibility of knowledge and the thesis that our mental experiences
are unique and lacking in existential import is faced with the same problem which Husserl
investigated. This is a problem concerning all matters which fall under the purview of thought,
mathematical, colourful, or otherwise.
This brings us to Husserl’s way of answering this problem. However, before going on to
look at Husserl’s solution we should note that this problem concerns the possibility of
knowledge. It does not address the issue of defining knowledge.
Current epistemology focuses largely on the definition of knowledge (namely the listing
of necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge). Quine and natural epistemology would
have us hold that issues of normativity are not necessary for knowledge and they then attempt to
provide sufficient conditions for knowledge without reference to normativity and within a natural
framework.35 Gettier troublesomely points out to us that justification, truth, and belief are (as a
set) insufficient for knowledge. Virtue theorists attempt to show the sufficiency of being
responsibly or reliably functioning agents in order to have knowledge.36 Plantinga insists that
evidence, of the classical evidentialist variety, is not necessary for knowledge.37 All of these
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theories assume that knowledge is in fact possible. They focus on either providing a definition of
it (the listing of the sufficient conditions for it, thus taking on a positive role) or they focus
primarily on refuting the definitions of other theories (taking on a negative role. Of course a
mixture of these positive and negative roles is quite common as well.
Husserl’s work, thus far, makes no attempt to affirm or deny any definition (in the sense
dealt with above) of knowledge. Husserl is addressing the sole question concerning the analysis
of the possibility of knowledge. Husserl distinguished then the definitional aspect of a theory of
knowledge from the aspect concerning its possibility by differentiating between Erklarung and
Aufklarung.38 Erklarung concerns explanation and explanation itself regards taking knowledge
as a natural fact and then subjecting it to various tests to further understand or define it. As there
are physical tests for scientists and their theories so there are thought experiments for
philosophers and their theories. In this way epistemology which follows the process of Erklarung
borrows from the natural sciences.39 Aufklarung though concerns clarification which does not
rest on any form of argumentation. One must simply “see what is there to be seen.”40
Husserl is advocating for an entirely different way of attempting to answer the question
concerning the possibility of knowledge. While much more will be said about the difference
between Aufklarung and Erklarung and the primacy of the former, Husserl’s clarifying approach
to the question concerning the possibility of knowledge rejects the idea of grounding this
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possibility in an argument. Arguments move from premises to a conclusion. But when dealing
with the possibility of knowledge all premises must be set aside at the outset. The process of
clarification does not rest on argumentation or experimentation (in any way close to the usual
sense of those terms). It concerns very careful and focused attention on what is happening. A
good example here may be what happens when thinking about the law of non-contradiction and
why it must be true. The law does not rest on any argument. That would be circular. But careful
thought which brings the law into clarity reveals why it must be true.
Given though that there is a subjective and an objective component to knowledge the
question arises: How does the subjective mind reach out and grasp the objective?41 The question
concerning the subject-object gap is the foundational epistemological question. As Willard points
out the answer to how this is possible turns into, at minimum, a necessary condition for the
possibility of knowledge.42 What Husserl offers us is a description of “the relationship between
the subjectivity of the knower and the objectivity of the content of knowledge.”43
1. Foundations for Locating Knowledge in a Husserlian System
Before delving into the epistemological work of Husserl it is necessary to lay out the
foundations of his philosophical methodology (his phenomenological system as a whole).
Husserl’s phenomenological methodology is deeply intertwined with his epistemology.
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However, its meticulously detailed development over tens of thousands of pages makes his
phenomenology far too broad and deep to cover here at any real depth. What will be given here
is a brief overview and introduction to the phenomenological method with the aim of equipping
us to understand Husserl’s epistemology.
The question which guides Husserl’s theory is “What is it about the nature of the mental
act which allows it to be ‘about’ something which may or may not exist?”44 This is a question
concerning the possibility of philosophical thought. Hence in addition to Sokolowski’s
description of Husserl’s thought as a ta meta ta psychika (beyond (in the foundational sense) the
psychical) we might further clarify it as being ta meta ta Sophia (beyond wisdom or
Philosophy).45 Characteristic of all philosophy, including skeptical philosophy, is that it attempts
to explain reality, it is directed at truth. In Husserl’s own words:
Philosophical thinking is circumscribed by one’s position towards the
problems concerning the possibility of cognition. The perplexities in which
reflection about the possibility of cognition that “gets at” the things themselves
becomes entangled: How can we be sure that cognition accords with things as
they exist in themselves, that it (cognition) “gets at them”?46
Skeptical philosophy then offers the greatest restraint to philosophical thinking,
circumscribing it to dealing with only the mind’s inability to grasp reality outside of it. However,
this inability is intended to be a statement or description of reality and as such it is philosophical
(having no regard for the practical import, or lack thereof, of such a theory). In such a system our
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minds do get at reality but the only bit of reality that they “get at” is quite small and rather
pessimistic. In even this restricted philosophy we see that there is a particular type of thinking
which “gets at” reality. The claim that “I can know whether there is a mind independent reality”
and the claim “I cannot know whether there is a mind independent reality” are both claims about
the reality of the knowing situation. So too is the claim “I do not know if I can or cannot know
whether there is a mind independent reality.”47 As such they share a particular form; a form
which they share with other claims such as “I know this is a pencil”, “God exists”, and “Science
is the only path to knowledge.” The assertions that “there are no such claims” or that “all such
claims are false” are self-defeating. Gregg Jesson remarks that:
The rejection of truth and knowledge simply presupposes some truth and knowledge. If
one is not claiming that his or her view is true, or if one is claiming not to know the view he or
she is defending, then the whole position collapses into self-contradiction. To say, “Today is
Tuesday but I’m not saying that this is true” or to say, “401 is a prime number, but I am not
saying that this is true,” is as confused and muddled as any view can possibly be.48
It seems to be unquestionable that there is a form of thought which is directed at grasping
reality. However limited these claims may be: “Cognition (read ‘Knowledge’) in general is
beyond question for to assert otherwise is a contradiction. The question of epistemology is not
“is there cognition?” but “Can cognition reach its objects?” ”49
Willard called the skeptical position (which attempts to deny that knowledge of objective
reality is possible) “Midas touch epistemology” (meaning whatever bit of objective reality the
mind tries to grasp hold of it immediately transforms into the subjective).50 He further points out
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how even this skeptical position is giving us an objective essence of cognition. Hence there
appears once again the overlap between world and mind.51
What Husserl undertook was an investigation into this peculiar form of thought, the form
of thought which is directed at “grasping” reality. An investigation which excludes all particular
claims of truths and looks at the nature or form of that particular aspect of cognition which “gets
at” reality; “when investigating cognition we look not at the particulars of some mental event but
at the universals, which are about cognition in general.”52
2. The Transcendental Reduction
In order to focus on the essential or universal form of anything (or simply to find out if
there is an essence or universal form of something) there are several things which much be
excluded according to Husserl. The first is all transcendences. This exclusion is brought about by
the epoche,53 or transcendental reduction.54 Husserl pointed out that during our everyday lives
we have a tendency to focus on the corporeal world (that is, on empirical data, and not on
essences, universals, or ideals). The former set quite naturally and easily lends itself to us and
our perception of it occurs with no deliberate effort on our own part.55 However, it is not in this
readily accessible natural world that essences are to be found if they are to be found at all. And

51

Ibid., §3

52

Edmund Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology, (AN) 44.

53

George Nakhnikian, Introduction to The Idea of Phenomenology, translated by Willaim Alston and
George Nakhnikian (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), XVII.
Jaakko Hintikka, “The Phenomenological Dimension,” in The Cambridge Companion to Husserl, edited
by Barry Smith and David Woodruff Smith, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 79.
54

55

See §27 in Ideas particularly the second paragraph, Edmund Husserl, Ideas, translated by Boyce Gibson
(New York, NY: Routledge 2012).

29

the ease with which we attend to the corporeal and the empirical then becomes a hindrance to our
attempts to not attend to it “The spell of naturalism… makes it so difficult for all of us to see
“essences” or “ideas”.”56
This transcendental reduction is not to be confused with the Cartesian method of doubt.
The existence of the transcendences is not to be doubted or indeed dealt with at all. Husserl says
it is assigned “the index of indifference.”57 As David Cooper helpfully points out the role of the
transcendental reduction serves in a similar way to the role of quotation marks.58 When in a class
studying Kant, Kant is quoted and his words put into quotation marks. The point of this is
usually not to focus on the words in such a way as to be directed towards an analysis of their
truth value. But instead to focus on the words in such a way as to be directed towards an
understanding of what is meant by the quote. “A likely purpose of putting… words inside
quotation marks is to concentrate attention on what is meant (Cooper’s emphasis) by them and
away from the question of their truth.”59 Attention (for the transcendental reduction) is to be
focused on the hyle (the raw sensory material presented to our minds) but, contra the natural
mindset, we are not to then be lead away to transcendences and inquiry concerning their nature
and possible or actual existence. Instead, one is to focus on the hyle in such a way as to be
directed towards an analysis of the structuring process of this raw material along with all the
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objects and relations found therein. This structuring process is called noesis, which is the
unifying act which makes any type of perception possible.60 “Thus there is little more to his
transcendental εποχη and examination of essences than a determination to examine the meaning
of common concepts and ordinary beliefs rather than to add factual detail to our knowledge.”61
And of course one of the results of this transcendental reduction is that what we are left with is
entirely immanent to us.
However, a mere excluding of transcendences does not constitute a sufficient condition
for the examination of essences though it is a necessary condition. Our mere attending to the
structuring process of cognition or mental acts as a whole does not yield inspectable universals.
To best understand Husserl’s way of getting from the inspection of non-transcendental hyle,
noesis, and all the other components and relations which make up a mental act, to essences we
must understand the eidetic reduction. The eidetic reduction ultimately concerns not removing
bits of data but in forming a different way of looking at those bits of data present in
consciousness. We must also understand Husserl’s two conceptions of transcendence and his two
conceptions of immanence.
3. The Beginner’s Immanence and Transcendence
One of the results of our aforementioned instance on an overlap between our
consciousness and reality is that reality in some way (no matter how small of a way it is)
interfaces with our consciousness and is immediately given to us.62 The first type of immanence
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involves nothing that points outside of itself and is fully self-given without evidence. Husserl
calls this reell or genuine immanence.63 Here one may think of the example of being appeared to
treely as the indubitable aspect of seeing a tree. This is what Husserl calls the beginners view of
immanence and transcendence.64 The immanent being that which is in me, such as my being
appeared to treely, and the transcendent being that which is outside of me, such as the tree itself,
which seeing a tree necessarily implies.65 Willard calls this ontological immanence and
transcendence. “Something is, of course, immanent to the act (read ‘mental act’ or ‘cognition in
the broadest sense’ as clarified below) or to the mind if it is genuinely (reell) contained in it as a
constituent, and correspondingly transcendent if it is not.”66 As noted above the transcendental
reduction excludes all transcendences because it is questionable and because our aim is the
explanation of how knowledge can reach its transcendent object and so all transcendent
knowledge or purported claims to knowledge are categorically ruled out.67
The parts of cognitions which are reellen immanent are particulars (that is they are
isolated and non-repeatable). But they stand in relation to one another. As Husserl says “They
(particular or isolated cognitions) enter into logical relations with each other, they follow from
one another, they “cohere” with one another, they support one another…”68 Willard points out
that seeing properties of and parts of a table, nonetheless something like the underside of this
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table, cannot occur without a very complex flow of mental cognitions and relations between
them.69 To be appeared to, for example, undersided-tablely is not possible in just any flow of
cognition. Consider being abducted, blindfolded and placed in a room under a table. Upon
having the blindfold removed and opening your eyes you will not be appeared to undersidedtablely. It will take a stream of several cognitions at least, e.g. being appeared to table-legly,
floorly, etc., and will require a significant background of cognitions. Similarly being appeared to
at all or any other form of mental act falls under what Husserl calls “cognition in the broadest
sense.”70
4. The Eidetic Reduction and Epistemological Immanence and Transcendence
Now it must be noted that these isolated cognitions are objective or transcendent in this
first sense in a special way. Swinburne notes that in order to tell a complete story of the universe
it would not only involve things like the battle of waterloo but also Napoleon’s thoughts during
the battle of waterloo.71 They thus have an objective element about them. Any person’s particular
cognition at any moment has “sensory content (which) stands there as content that is given,
sensed, and recognized by this person, and integrates itself within the perception of objective
time… it appears as a datum in objective time… thus it is a phenomenon in keeping with the
sense of the positive science we call psychology.”72 This fact (of the transcendent aspect of
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cognitions) requires us to perform an additional reduction which further excludes such
transcendences.
This reduction Husserl calls the phenomenological reduction or eidetic reduction or
abstraction.73 It is a way of looking at things. As in the former reduction the emphasis here is not
on excluding bits of data but excluding ways of looking at that data. The natural tendency, it was
noted, was to merely use the ontologically immanent cognitions in order to add to our factual
knowledge or merely in order to function appropriately. There is then a similarly “psychological”
tendency to look at these given cognitions in such a way as to attend to the objective
transcendent facts of our inner “psychic” or “mental” experiences.74 In so attending we miss the
key to the witness of essences. It was an analysis of these objective mental components that Kant
based his critique of pure reason off of (where he worked at establishing objective laws and
regulations which govern subjective consciousness).75 And for not excluding these objective
mental cognitions in the appropriate way Husserl criticized Kant and claimed superiority over
Kant’s critique of knowledge.76 What Kant needed, on a Husserlian account, was the eidetic
reduction. In bracketing out these psychological, or egological, transcendences we are left with a
pure perception of consciousness (e.g. perception of all that is going on and contained in the act
of being appeared to tablely).
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This “pure” perception corresponds to the second type of immanence and transcendence.
This second form of transcendence Willard refers to as “epistemological transcendence.”77 Lee
Hardy refers to this latter concept of immanence and transcendence as “Phenomenological
transcendence and immanence.”78 The “pure” perception is a perception which is directed at a
purely ontologically immanent perception. As Husserl says it is “a reflective and purely
immanent perception which has undergone the reduction.”79 The purely immanent perception
refers to nothing transcendent and so it makes no sense to doubt it: “to have an appearance
before one’s eye, which refers to something that is not itself given in the phenomenon, and to
doubt whether it exists or how its existence is to be understood- that makes sense. But to see and
intend nothing other than what is grasped in the seeing, and yet still question and doubt-that
makes no sense at all.”80 Since this reduction places these cognitions before us in such a way
that we see them clearly they thus become immanent in the second sense.
These individual cognitions are not necessarily immanent in this latter sense though,
hence the requirement of the second reduction along with the attention to perception that
necessarily accompanies it. Consider the case where one is driving home and being appeared to
treely repeatedly yet the individual pays no attention to them. These appearances (when
investigated as mere appearances of trees) are purely immanent in the first sense. But, as many
mature and skilled drivers can confirm from their own experiences, they remain very
transcendent in the latter sense. We pay no attention to them at all such that we would have to
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“replay” our appearances in order to answer the question “Were you appeared to treely during
your drive?” A further example is when something suddenly “clicks” with a person. Consider
when someone finally understands the difference between validity and soundness. What their
mind is doing is purely immanent in the first sense (the ontological sense). However, these
mental operations are often opaque to them (i.e. transcendent in the latter sense,
epistemologically). Imagine asking someone who finally grasped this distinction “What did you
do just now to make sense of it?” Think about the confused look and muddled response you
would get in turn.
The trouble, says Husserl, is that on the beginner’s view of immanence and
transcendence the two different forms of immanence and transcendence are conflated. It is
implicitly assumed both that what is ontologically immanent is epistemologically immanent (but
as argued above this is not so, and it certainly is not necessarily so) and that what is ontologically
transcendent is epistemologically transcendent. Willard succinctly puts the point this way:
“Something immanent in the latter sense (epistemological immanence) may be transcendent in
the first sense (ontologically)… and something transcendent in the second sense
(epistemologically) might be immanent in the first sense, as with a thought or valuation not fully
focused on in intuition.”81 It is this epistemological immanence that is the goal of both
reductions.82 And Husserl uses the terms ‘evidenz’ and ‘anschauung’ (or what Husserl says is the
correct use and conception of the a priori) to denote this concept.83 In English translations this
concept appears as ‘evidence’ or ‘intuition’ (these being the common translations of the
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aforementioned German terms but ‘the immediately given’ or ‘ “seeing” ’ often appear as
well).84
This distinction between the two types of immanence and transcendence immediately
opens the door for the possibility of something being ontologically transcendent but
epistemologically immanent. Hence, for the possibility of the subjective mind to reach objective
reality. What remains for Husserl is to find out what it is exactly that survives this final reduction
(and as such is thus able to be “seen”) and then to determine whether the overlap of mind and
reality into a state of intuition can be drawn into this sphere.85 As Willard notes this determining
of how it could be possible to draw in this overlap must be prior to the answering of the question
as to whether it is possible or not.86
5. Aufklarung and Erklarung
Before further explication of Husserl’s view it is important to reemphasis the difference
in function of and nature of auflkarung, or clarification, as opposed to erklarung, or explanation.
Doing so will help us understand what it is that survives the reductions and what type of analysis
we should expect to be given. Husserl helpfully explains the difference between these two, and
provides a nice illustration as well, in his introduction to The Idea of Phenomenology. In the
section where he is discussing his search for the possibility of knowledge he says,
What I want is clarity (emphasis in the original). I want to understand the
possibility of this contact, that is, if we consider what we mean here: I want to
bring within my purview the essence of the possibility of this contact, to bring it
to givenness in an act of seeing. A “seeing” cannot be demonstrated. A blind
84
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person who would like to be able to see cannot acquire that ability through
scientific demonstrations; physical and physiological theories of color yield no
intuitive clarity about the sense of color comparable to the clarity possessed by
those who can see.87
Here Husserl is describing how to obtain clarity (Klarheit) in the understanding of the
contact between the subjective and the transcendent. What Husserl is opposed to is any process
of “deducing, inducing, calculating, and the like” which reasons from things given, or
established, to something not yet given while in the process of understanding the possibility of
knowledge.88 Such an instance is easily understood when one considers that the answer to the
possibility of knowledge would be viciously circular if any such attempt was made. Deduction
and induction both depend on something already being given and proceeding from there (either
with certainty or probability respectively); even the simplest argument must have a premise. All
positive sciences proceed by such methods and therefore cannot be used in answering the
question of the possibility of knowledge. Such sciences would only constitute what Husserl
called “a mistaken μεταβασι.”89 Husserl ties the process of erklarung with the positive sciences
and insists that to avoid the vicious circularity and find a true μεταβασις our only option is to
seek and use aufklarung instead. To best understand the basis for this claim it is helpful to go
back to the domain of mathematics.
Richard Tieszen discusses the problem different theories of mathematics have in trying to
do justice to the objectivity of mathematics and provide a metamathematical theory which
provides a basis for the practicality and usefulness of mathematics as well as the seemingly
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objective and intuitive pull of mathematics.90 He notes that Hilbertian projects, which constitute
an explanative approach through the use of theorems, is plagued by Gödel’s incompleteness
theorem.91 As in the case of mathematics (or in the case of the law of non-contradiction as
discussed earlier) or (and this is the center for our discussion) the possibility of knowledge, our
ability to explain or argue for certain key bits of data cannot be covered by argumentation,
explanation, or any other type of maxim.
Other pragmatic or Quinean approaches suffer from a non-intuitiveness and subject
mathematics to the natural sciences.92 While in mathematics the distillation of math to the natural
sciences may be undesirable and counterintuitive it does not fall prey to the Husserlian criticism
of a mistaken μεταβασι in the same way that such an attempt would when applied to the
possibility of knowledge (in the latter case it is truly impossible to do so. The only way even a
pseudo attempt to do this can be made is by shifting, albeit subtly, the question).93 Regardless,
what is of importance here is the need for a foundation for math that extends beyond the merely
practical. Gödel’s incompleteness theorem was developed with Husserl’s philosophy in mind and
directed at all attempts to fully “explain” mathematics.94 Both Husserl’s and Gödel’s approach is
that below all explanation there must be an intuitive “seeing” which relies on nothing outside of
itself and neither needs nor can have a full explanation. The clarity of “sight” is itself the only
proper and possible foundation for such knowledge (indeed for knowledge in general and the
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possibility therein). After painstaking development of the phenomenological reduction Husserl
says, “This discussion is, of course, only a roundabout way of helping us to see what is to be
seen here.”95
Husserl’s processes is not what has become the common method of analytic philosophy.
The analytic method is that of the postulating of entities, relations, causes, and the like, and then
attempting to show how they explain the relevant data (how the data can be “deduced, induced,
calculated, and the like” from them). Willard also supports this understanding of Husserl and his
position when discussing intentionality. He shows the infinite regress and circularity of
appealing to “meanings” (which amount to the postulation of an entity to explain intentionality)
and shows Husserl’s marked distinction from this approach: “The goal for Husserl is, instead, to
describe intentionality in terms of its essential characteristics and differentiations, and in relation
to the internal complexities of the acts upon which, in its various forms, it is founded or
essentially depends-the descriptions to be guided by intuition of those characteristics,
differentiations and inner founding structures themselves.”96 Tieszen also rightly says in regards
to Husserl’s theory of mathematics that “Husserl is advocating a descriptive method for
clarification of the meaning of mathematical concepts.”97
Whatever the status of such a clarifying approach is it remains clear that in several cases
(e.g. the possibility of knowledge, mathematics, and intentionality) this approach avoids the
problems of infinite regress and vicious circularity. It is thus at least able to provide an account
(albeit a descriptive one) where explanative processes are lacking. Again specifically in the case
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of the possibility of knowledge this approach seems to be the only possible option due to the
nature of explanation.
Now, one might object that such an account (i.e. one that offers clarification) is subpar to
an explanatory account. I think Husserl would rightly argue that since all explanatory approaches
rely on or assume an account which is based on clarification (per the above arguments
concerning Gödel and Midas touch epistemology) such preference is a mere bias for the
“scientific” or natural mindset. This is further established by the points made above concerning
skepticism and “Midas touch epistemology.” Something must be given to us without mediation.
And the answers to “What is given to us?” and “How much is given to us without mediation?”
requires clarification of the unmediated process. Furthermore (whether this process is less
desirable or not) it would remain for the detractor to provide an additional account of the
possibility of knowledge or of some defeater to the account given above. An alleged superiority
of eklarung over aufklarung amounts to neither.
6. Essences and Universals
So in returning to our development of the question “what is it that remains after the
reductions?” Husserl’s answer is (as was noted at the beginning of our discussion) essences or
universals. Husserl says that eidetic abstraction “yields inspectable universals, species, essences,
and so it seems to provide the redeeming idea (the redeeming idea concerning how to connect the
subjective with the objective).” 98 What lies before us after the reductions is the essence of
cognition in Husserl’s broad sense. And so any act of cognition, any mental act, can be laid
before us in a pure “seeing.” We can “see” perception and other various mental acts, including
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knowledge itself. The phenomenological reduction has laid bare to us not things like an
individual perception but perception itself (perception as a universal or the essence of
perception). Husserl says, “Surely I can get clear on the essence of knowledge when I see it for
myself, and when it is itself given to me, just as it is, in “seeing.” I must study knowledge
immanently, through a pure seeing, within the pure phenomenon, within “pure consciousness”:
its transcendence is, of course, dubitable; the existence of the objectivity, to which it refers, is not
given to me insofar as it is transcendent.”99 We should now have, then, a clear understanding of
the phenomenological method for obtaining an understanding of how Knowledge is possible.
7. A Defense of “Seeing”
Before moving on to the final stages of development of Husserl and his theory of
knowledge it is appropriate that some objections to Husserl’s theory of “seeing” should first be
dealt with. So what of detractors who claim that such pure acts of “seeing” are impossible,
unlikely, or even that they themselves are not able to obtain such “seeing” and so cast doubt and
suspicion of the legitimacy of the process? The first line of response regards all arguments
against “seeing” which argue against “seeing” because of some other “fact” which serves as a
defeater for Husserl’s theory.100 This approach to objecting to this aspect of Husserl’s theory,
though, rests on a false μεταβασι. Since Husserl is here dealing with the problem of the
possibility of knowledge to rely on some datum or any number of data, of “evidence,” “fact,” or
the like to defeat “seeing,” or any other component of his theory at this level of the discussion, is
to attempt to use what has already been thrown aside at the outset of the discussion (and thrown
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aside necessarily due to the nature of the discussion). It would only be fitting to either show
where Husserl himself has broken this rule or provide an alternate account of how knowledge is
possible.
The second line of defense concerns arguments which appeal to experience. These
arguments claim that either they themselves do not experience “seeing” or that what is there to
be seen are not universals or essences. In response to the first form of argumentation it is helpful
to return to the discussion of symbolic thinking that led Husserl and us down this path of
discussion.
As Willard notes, strongly rooted in common sense is that things appear before us (i.e.
that we have minds and things appear to us in our minds).101 Those objects can be represented to
us in our minds in one of two ways, authentically, where the object itself is fully present (if this
were to occur then I could have certainty concerning the object for it would be epistemologically
immanent) or symbolically (i.e. inauthentically, the object itself is not fully present in the
manifold of experience but mediated. This mediation process may, of course, be accurate or
inaccurate and so we do not have certainty here). The fact that something appears (though we
need not take ‘appears’ here to denote some sort of visual or image based process) before our
minds when we think of things requires that these two are mutually exhaustive. But note that the
mediation process requires a stand-in of sorts, a symbol. And this symbol is given to us
authentically. For if it was not, we would run afoul in one of two ways. First by an infinite
regress. If the symbol is not given authentically then it is given through something else, another
symbol. And that symbol would be given authentically or symbolically. If given symbolically
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then the question repeats and we find that we have an infinite regress or we must terminate in
something authentically given. If we answer that this second level symbol is given authentically
then we find that (due to the definition of our symbol as a stand-in, which is necessitated by our
division into authentic and inauthentic givenness) the true object of our consciousness was our
first level symbol and not the object which stands behind it. So we have simply found out that
what was claimed to be the object of our consciousness was not the object of our consciousness
and we have reaffirmed and clarified our position (the symbol for the object of our consciousness
is given to us authentically). And this authentic givenness is nothing more than the process of
“seeing.” So even in the claim “I don’t experience or see “seeing” ” it is required that something,
some object of cognition, be authentically given.
The last defense of Husserl’s theory is a response to arguments which claim upon
inspecting what is there to be “seen” universals or essences are not found. Husserl, rather
pointedly, considers this a form of blindness. He says, “blindness to ideas (essences) is a kind of
psychic blindness, which through prejudices’ renders us incapable of bringing into the field of
judgment what we have already in our field of intuition.”102 Willard notes that Husserl did not
see essences or universal as mysterious at all.103 One of the major forms of prejudicial blindness
comes from naturalism. Husserl says:
The spell of the naturalistic point of view, to which all of us at the outset
are subject and which makes us incapable of prescinding from nature and hence,
too, of making the psychical an object of intuitive investigation from the pure
rather than from the psychophysical point of view, has here blocked the road to a
great science unparalleled in its fecundity, a science which is on the one hand the
fundamental condition for a completely scientific psychology and on the other the
field for the genuine critique of reason. The spell of inborn naturalism also
consists in the fact that it makes it so difficult for all of us to see "essences,' or
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"ideas"—or rather, since in fact we do, so to speak, constantly see them, for us to
let them have the peculiar value which is theirs instead of absurdly naturalizing
them, Intuiting essences conceals no more difficulties or "mystical" secrets than
does perception.104
The readily available “natural” world and our overriding, and often understandable,
concern with practical matters is the natural attitude and it is the foundation for naturalism.
Looking at essences or taking psychical (mental) experiences as objects of thought is too
“unnatural.” And so one resolves to look only “naturally” “physically” or pragmatically at the
data. This can all too easily lead to the claim that natural entities, as well as the methods used to
explain them, are all that exist. But this is no argument for naturalism or the view that essences
cannot be clearly brought before one’s intuitive grasp. Husserl, rather than attempting to prove
that essences are grasped, that “seeing” is legitimate, explains why it is hard and why some think
it cannot be done. The defense of “seeing” is not through explanation but an insistence that those
who put forth the effort can gain clarity about it and so “see” that “seeing” is actual.
Willard also in his own right argued that essences are commonly seen and understood and
made use of.105 Willard in a lecture titled “What it Means to be Human” gives the example of
books. He argues that the filing system for books in libraries by author, subject material, etc. (as
opposed to being filed by something like color or size) is based off of knowledge of the nature or
essence of books.106 This filing system is not unintuitive nor does it require deep analysis, or
even a listing of the necessary and sufficient conditions for any X being a book, to understand. It
“just makes sense.” And no one seems to have any difficulty understanding why these categories
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are used and not others. This echoes Husserl’s claim that “Our critics in truth see, and so to
speak continuously see, “ideas”, “essences” ---makes use of them in thought, formulate
judgments concerning essences--- only from their epistemological “standpoint” they explain the
same away.”107
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III. Knowledge
A. Knowledge and the Acts and Relations of Consciousness that Survive the Reductions
1. Introduction
Now we should be equipped to return to our discussion of what it is that survives these
reductions and how Husserl draws knowledge, the overlap of the subjective with the objective,
into the field immanence. It was noted earlier that cognitions do not stand in isolation from each
other but they stand in relation with other cognitions, cohering with them, supporting them, etc.
These inter-cognitive relations (as well as intra-cognitive relations) can be given in a pure act of
“seeing.” And these “seeable” relations will prove most important. Hintikka rightly notes that it
is erroneous to see the function of the phenomenological reductions as focusing one’s intentions
on mental objects and blocking out transcendences (Hintikka means metaphysical
transcendencies here): “Such an exclusive concentration inevitably brackets, not merely
(metaphysically transcendent) objects, but the relation of noemata (intentional or mental objects)
to (transcendent) objects.”108 It should also be reemphasized that the aim of the reductions is not
to block out metaphysically transcendent objects and relations but epistemologically
transcendent relations.109
2. Intentionality
To understand these specific relations, we must first better understand the general inner
structure of mental acts and their objects. This paper allows for neither a thorough treatment of
108
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Husserl’s general theory of intentionality nor for an avoidance of it altogether. A full
development of the inner structures of consciousness according to Husserl lies outside of the
scope of this paper. What follows is largely Willard’s development and interpretation of
Husserl’s position. This is warranted for the focus of this paper is on the application of a
Willardarin-Husserlian account of knowledge and its application to current epistemology. This
limitation enables us to avoid a thorough treatment of views which lie outside of Husserl’s
(including Husserl and Willard’s arguments against these counter views, as well as some of the
applications and implications of Husserl’s own view). Some mention of these opposing views
and the problems associated with them (as claimed by Willard and Husserl) will be given in
order to help clarify and understand their own position. But this should not be taken as a
refutation of those views. The aim here is only an explication of an HW theory of intentionality
as it pertains to the possibility of knowledge. .
It must be remembered that the primary question which concerns Husserl’s philosophical
works is “How can the objective be grasped by the subjective?” Frederick Olafson correctly
notes that Husserl was concerned with avoiding the sequestering of both the intentional act and
the intentional object as being ontologically immanent (what Olafson refers to as the
“intramental”).110 Husserl’s theory of intentionality was not something developed in separation
from (and so not something that should be understood apart from) his epistemological work.
Hence our need to explicate his view (the two are connected). Husserl’s concern is with
establishing (through the phenomenological method developed above) the connecting of the
subjective with the objective. Hence his method differs from many of his contemporaries as well
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as current methodologies. The more influential approach (taken by Husserl’s mentor Brentano
and others) was quite the opposite from Husserl’s. Brentano tried to explain how one can intend
things like unicorns even though they do not exist (what I shall call the unicorn problem).111
Husserl’s starting point, in contrast, was not to try and explain how non-existing things could be
intended but what it meant for anything at to be intended.
Their views on intentionality were not entirely opposed though. Willard notes that for
both Husserl and Brentano the object of an intentional act is part of what makes the act what it is
(it is part of the acts essence).112 Two intentional acts of consciousness are partly individuated by
the object they are directed toward or about. In cases where two acts are of or about the same
thing but differ, they have the same intentional essence but differ in properties which are
accidental to their intentionality (e.g. their location in time, or in the person which performs the
act).113 Due to this relation of the act and its object, Brentano’s description of the intentional act
centered on the object. This explains, in part, Brentano’s focus on the object of intentionality and
trying to solve the unicorn problem by positing the intentional object as something which is
always ontologically immanent. Husserl, with his phenomenological method, on the other hand
focused on the ‘ofness’ or ‘aboutness’ of intentionality (the nature of the act itself, independent
of all other objects), which contains a specific relationship between the act and its object.114 Thus
making the object of the act and its existence secondary (without sacrificing the thesis that two
acts with differing objects cannot be the same or that two acts with the same object must be
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intentionally the same). Husserl’s theory can then roughly be put in the camp of adverbial
theories of intentionality.115
Husserl’s approach to the question then was quite different from Brentano’s or even
Frege’s. Frege (though his theory was different from Brentano’s) similarly focused on
explication of a certain type of entity and our interaction with it to explain intentionality. Willard
helpfully summarizes the difference between Husserl’s methodology in regards to developing a
theory of intentionality as opposed to Frege’s (though it applies equally well to Brentano’s and to
the Fregian legacy which lives on through the analytic tradition).
It is the radical difference on this point which must, above all, be kept in
mind when comparing Husserl and Frege, and which leads one to think that
Frege’s views perhaps have little use in the exposition of Husserl. It is, I think, not
clearly true that “The goal of Husserlian theory of intentionality is to tell us just
what kind of entity an act’s content is and to convince us that an experience’s
involvement with an entity of that kind is both necessary and sufficient for the
intentionality of the experience.” The goal for Husserl is, instead, to describe
intentionality in terms of its essential characteristics and differentiations, and in
relation to the internal complexities of the acts upon which, in its various forms, it
is founded or essentially depends – the descriptions to be guided by intuition of
those characteristics, differentiations and inner founding structures themselves.116

a. Noetic and Noematic Intentionality
As previously mentioned noesis is the structuring process which operates on hyle and it is
carried out by the noeses. It is responsible for structuring the hyle into intentional experiences
and serves as the foundation for both knowledge and intentionality.117 Certainly a mere
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representation, or even a stream of representations would not be sufficient for the kind of
consciousness that would be required for knowledge to be possible (Here the familiar points of
Searle’s Chinese room thought experiment have application).118 A mere possessing of sensory
data is not sufficient but a certain kind of possessing them must be in place as well. Hence the
man in the room though possessing the data (the cards with Chinese on them) does not possess it
in an appropriate way to be considered to be aware of what is going on or even of
communication. Husserl says “it is evident a priori… that thinking subjects must be in general
able to perform, e.g., all sorts of acts in which theoretical knowledge is made real. We must, in
particular, as thinking beings, be able to see propositions as truths, and to see truths as
consequences of other truths, and again to see laws as such, to see law as explanatory grounds,
and to see them as principles, etc.”119 Willard explains that the noetic conditions are what make
human and any other type of knowing possible.120 Though not all noeses necessarily operate off
of hyle or sense data (as is the case with humans), the process involved in seeing propositions as
truth (and the other examples given by Husserl) must be there in order for knowledge to be
possible. The noetic component, however, is not the whole of a mental act. Although the noesis
is the foundation for having a single unified process.
There are three parts of a mental act as a whole, the hyletic, noetic and neomatic. The
first two parts have been addressed to some extent (much more will be said about the noetic
component, though) and the third will be addressed shortly. The noematic part is that which
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relates to noemata and their relations. A noema is often stated as “the object as intended.”121 It is
often accompanied by an image or linguistical entity but whether these appear or not it is an
ontologically immanent object (like the image or linguistical entity, though it is something
distinct from them).
In discussing Noemata we must be sure to steer clear of what Willard calls “the common
assumption” (this is in regards to interpretations of Husserl and his theory of intentionality). The
assumption is that if a noema is an object then it is the object of the act.122 From this assumption
two major views develops. The first is that the noema is an object and is therefore the object of
the act (it is the intended object). This results in Husserl slipping into some form of idealism. The
second is that the noema (being ontologically immanent) is not the intended object and is
therefore not an object at all but something along the lines of a Fregian sense. Both views are
misguided by the same assumption though.123 The noema is an object (it possess predicates) but
it is not the intentional object.124
We here enter into what Husserl calls the essential two sidedness of intentionality, the
noetic and the noematic.125 For Husserl intentionality is a complex stream not a singular strand.
Much confusion arises from pitting noetic and noematic intentionality against each other (it is
this area of confusion which leads to seeing Husserl’s later work in Ideas as being a replacement
to his work in The Logical Investigations and the beginning of his slip away from realism into a
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form of idealism).126 Let us start with an example and then try to explain Husserl’s position from
there.
Imagine seeing a ball on a stand that appears to be blue. The ball then changes to a green
colour and then again to a red. Upon further inspection it is noticed that several different lights
are directed at the ball. One is blue, one green, and one red. Now when viewed under a neutral
light the ball appears white. We now understand that the ball is white and appears to be the
differing colours because of the lights shining on it. Now when the blue light shines on the ball
the mental image that we have of the ball will be (most likely) blue. However, the ball will not
be thought to be blue but rather white. We have here then a case where our mental image does
not match the object itself but yet is not really misleading either.
Let us run through the moments of the initial mental act. Sense data is given and received
and this represents the hyletic phase. The noetic phase follows which interprets the data and
directs it towards an object, the intentional object. This directing process produces and is then
accompanied by (as opposed to producing and then being replaced by) the noematic phase which
produces a noema and often an image or a linguistical entity. The noema has a sense, in the
Fregeian sense of the term. The noematic phase then includes the generation of an object (i.e. the
noema) as well as a specific meaning for that object. So in our example the sense data of a blue
ball is given, this is interpreted as “there being a blue ball” and a specific mental object comes
onto the scene which is represented by an image. The noema is not an image but is the source of
that image (the image itself has a specific direction towards the intentional object). This process
repeats, though differing in minor aspects, for the seeing of the green ball, red ball, the lights,
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and the white ball. These mental acts, the seeing of a blue ball etc., stand in a specific relation to
each other. The noesis operates on these individual mental acts, in much the same way as it did
with the individual datum which composed the hyletic data. It restructures them and forms a new
intentional object “there being a white ball.” The new intentional object is likewise accompanied
by a noema and it should be clear that both the noema and the intentional object are produced by
the noesis. As Willard points out the noetic comes first both in study and in the actual sequence
of the mental act.127
The image that we have of the white ball when the blue light is shining on it, after we
have realized that it is white, may yet be blue. So while the sense data is relevantly similar (it
does differ in time and almost assuredly to some extent place) to our initial sense data from when
we first saw it under the blue light, it will nevertheless appear quite different to us (i.e. our
engagement with it, what we take it to be, is totally different). In this case the intentional object
and the object as it is intended are different though the sense data remains similar. We can alter
the case to one of the familiar situations where we see something in the distance or see some
strange picture but in either case we cannot “make sense” of the data.128 This presents the same
situation where sensory data remains the same but the object differs (though in this case the
actual image corresponding to the noema will be different). Likewise there are cases where
sensory data changes but the intentional object does not, as when the different coloured lights
shine on the ball but it is understood to be white. These examples serve to show that sensory data
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and images, or linguistical entities, are not sufficient to determine either the intentional object or
the object as intended. The above cases show where sensory data changes but both objects
remain the same and cases where the data remains the same but the objects differ (hopefully the
remaining two cases, where data and object remain the same and where both differ, are easily
understood without examples). What this shows is that we think in senses (in this context
‘senses’ refers to the various possible types of images and linguistical units) but not with them.
As Willard neatly puts it (along with a helpful analogy): “As Husserl lays out the act/object
nexus nothing at all is done with the concept in the act of which it is the sense - though a long
story is to be told about how the various parts of the act function. We walk in steps, not with
them. Stepping is walking. And fundamentally, we think, perceive, etc., in senses (concepts,
propositions), not with them.”129
This allows for Husserl to explain why the objects that we are perhaps naively disposed
to think of as the objects of our consciousness are ontologically immanent (are objects of our
consciousness) and do play a complicated part in the acts, but all the while not being the objects
of our consciousness (it would be hard to imagine what it would be like in the ball example
above to not have some accompanying image but have identically the same intentional act). We
are conscious of these things in our mental acts but this does not mean that they must therefore
be the objects of our acts.130 And noemata are the “enlivened” and used (used in the way that
Willard above means by “in”) images, concepts, propositions, etc. They are therefore a part of
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the reellen components of the act, meaning that they are part of the “individual, dependent
phases or “moments” which, like the whole act itself, are non-sharable and non-repeatable.”131
Similarly one aspect of the noetic is reellen: the unifying aspect which uniquely fits the
individual act within a history of acts and makes it this specific act. However, both the noetic and
the noematic phases also have an irreellen content to them. As irreellen they do belong to the act
but are not parts of the act.132 The hyletic components as a whole and the noetic and noematic
components in part belong to the essence of this specific act. Any act identical to A1 contains
H1, N1, and M1 and any act containing H1, N1, and M1 are identical to A1. They are thus a part
of the act. However, the irreellen components of the noetic and noematic, N2 and M2, may
belong to A1 but an acts having N2 and M2 does not mean that it is A1. The irreellen noetic and
noematic components are those which “belong” to the object of the act.133 They are thus ideal or
universals.
Let us return to the white ball example to try and further explicate what was just said.
Consider the situation where the blue light shines on the ball but we know it to be a white ball.
Certainly, as was pointed out above, the hyletic components of seeing the ball are non-repeatable
and non-shareable. Also the image, senses, and the like which correspond to the noematic phases
of the act are non-shareable. Also the unifying feature of the noesis which fits the act into a
specific subject’s history of acts is likewise non-repeatable and non-sharable (reflection on the
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mere fact that the hyletic components are what the noesis operates on and that the noematic
components are dependent on the noetic ones shows this to be true). However, any act which has
the white ball as its intentional object will have a similar “intentional direction.” This intentional
direction is something which belongs to the object itself then rather than the mental acts which
are thus directed.
b. Intentional Direction
Part of the essence of an act is that it has this or that “intentional direction,” (i.e.
meaning). But the essence of this or that intentional direction is not part of any specific act.
Willard helpfully shows why this must be.134 If we allow for the essence of the act to be outside
of the intentional direction then we could have identically the same act but directed at a different
object (in this case seeing the white ball under the blue and taking it to be blue, as in our first
case, and seeing it under the blue light but taking it to be white would be the same). But if we
allow for a specific intentional direction to be indifferent to the types of acts it appears in then
this would allow for the act to have any content whatever and still be about the same thing. “The
intentionality of an act has to be its (the acts) essence.”135 But what remains open to us in an act
of pure intuition, “seeing,” is the fact that differing acts have the same intentional direction. Thus
the essence of the intentional direction is not a part of the essence of any particular act which has
that intentionality as its essence. The intentionality of an act is thus part of its reellen and
irreellen parts.
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It is on the basis of this insight that Husserl argued against psychologism. (Husserl’s
rejection of psychologism was another of his career defining and theory shaping beliefs. It
worked alongside and was intimately connected to his concern with the grasping of the objective
in the subjective.) The objects and relations under investigation by the logician are the objects of
her thoughts or mental acts, her non-sharable non-repeatable thoughts. But upon
phenomenological investigation she can see that the objects of her investigation remain the same
under many different acts (one must remember that the mental acts are non-repeatable even for
her). These logical entities are then something which transcend her individual thoughts (the
reellen components). They can be grasped by multiple minds, hence Quine’s and Husserl’s
assertions about modus ponens are about the same thing.136 The noetic process leading one to a
grasp of these logical realities may be, indeed must be, different for each person and even the
same person at different times. Yet they all share in participating in a common essence of some
intentionality, or meaning or intentional direction.
What this shows is that objects and relations which survive the reductions are of two
types, ontologically immanent (the reellen components of a mental act) and ontologically
transcendent (the irreellen and ideal components). The ideal are universals since they can be
multiply instantiated, “identically the same in many acts.”137 For Husserl, then, what matters is
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that through the reductions the objects of our mental acts are brought into epistemological
immanence. But ontologically eminent objects are not brought into this epistemological
immanence in any special way as distinct from ontologically transcendent objects. Husserl then
differs drastically from Kant in this way who seems to offer no real explanation for, or
clarification of, the connection between sense data and the concepts which emerge from them.
The connection of the minds “grasp” or knowledge of these clearly ontologically immanent
relations remains obscure. Willard’s comments and quotes on Husserl here are invaluable:
“He (Husserl) points out that Kant tried to “save” knowledge, show that it
is possible, before determining what it is, “before subjecting it to a clarifying
critique and analysis of essence” (Logical Investigations 833). This is further
traced to Kant’s failure to get clear on the specific nature of “pure Ideation, the
adequate survey of conceptual essences, and the laws of universal validity rooted
in those essences” (Ibid.). On Husserl’s view, such a failure is built into any effort
that is not “a critique based on “seeing” ” (Idea of Phenomenology 50).”138

3. Knowledge
a. Authentic and Symbolic Knowledge
We are now ready to consider Husserl’s theory of knowledge. Hopefully what has been
said already concerning intentionality and the phenomenological method as a whole will provide
ease of insight into Husserl’s thoughts here on this matter.
It is time to revisit some of the concepts that we dealt with in the preceding sections. It
was argued that the objects of consciousness fall into one of two types, either authentically given
or inauthentically given (i.e. to be given symbolically). We also mentioned earlier that one of the
important things which survives the reductions are relations between mental acts and that the
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function of the reductions is not to exclude transcendences in the ontological sense but in the
epistemological sense. It remains, therefore, for the intentional object to be given symbolically
and to be given authentically. And the recognition of a certain relation between these
experiences, the moving from the inauthentic to the authentic, to be laid open in a pure act of
“seeing.” In short the recognition of this relation between two acts is knowledge. Willard
succinctly puts it as “Knowing is… finding something to be as it is thought to be.”139 And this
can occur in one of two ways. The first is when the latter act contains an act of pure intuition and
the second is when the nature of a specific type of symbolic representation is given to us and a
specific symbolic representation of that type directs us to a concept (though that concept itself is
not given in an act of pure intuition). As Willard points out it is therefore wrong to attribute the
view to Husserl that all knowledge rests on a state of intuition: “We must, then, permanently set
aside the misunderstanding that, for him (Husserl), knowledge of a truth, a state of affairs or an
object, either is or requires an intuition of it.140
It is here that our talk of the inauthentic (i.e. symbolic) and authentic and Husserl’s work
in mathematics is most helpful. Small numbers are easily grasped in intuition, such as the
number 2. And the specific relation “2 < 4” is also easily grasped in intuition. But large numbers
such as 3,141,592,653 are just beyond our intuitive grasp. And the relation specified by
“3,141,592,653 < 5,897,932,384” is just not something we can bring into our intuitive grasp
(similar examples can be construed in logic). While a simple argument demonstrating modus
ponens may be grasped in intuition a twenty or thirty step proof is not. Hence in working with
one of these longer proofs the simple steps are merely referred to without actually having to
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write them out (e.g. we write the conclusion of an instance of hypothetical syllogism and merely
reference the lines we used and ‘HS’ on the side). This is normal and acceptable because those
moves can be “seen,” intuitively tracked. But the argument as a whole (the twenty or so steps)
needs to be broken down into these smaller bits. After that we can know that it is valid. But we
know this not through an intuition of the two or three premises and the conclusion and their
relation (as in modus ponens and the like) but through our understanding of these smaller steps
and their relation to the whole.
Husserl points out in regards to mathematics (and the same can be said for logic) that if
these relations could be drawn into intuitive grasp then the processes of arithmetic would be
superfluous.141 “Indeed, the whole sum of arithmetic is… nothing other than a sum of artificial
devices for overcoming the essential imperfections of our intellect.”142 Hence even after our
logical proof it would be odd and unacceptable to refer to these twenty or so steps as something
like ‘A1’ and use it in a longer forty or so step proof. What is of special note here is that the oft
given paradigm of knowledge (mathematics) largely rests on this symbolic representations.
In both of these cases (the mathematical examples and the logical examples) what can be
brought into intuition is the symbolic system used to represent these numbers or propositions and
their relations. And so knowledge of these sorts of truths, states of affairs or objects which stand
outside our intuitive grasp can be known by us when the nature of the symbolic form of thinking
which represents (where the mental act does not include its object as an epistemologically
immanent content) the truth, state of affairs or object is known to us, that is brought into intuitive

141

Edmund Husserl, The Philosophy of Arithmetic,” 201.

142

Ibid., 202.

61

grasp.143 “It is, Husserl thinks, only our experience of symbolic representations passing over into
authentic consciousness of their objects that gives us the concept of sign, and then makes us
“familiar with that practical equivalence between authentic representations and their symbols
which make possible the use of the latter in place of the former.” ”144 The symbol system of logic
or mathematics (or any other symbol system) must be brought into intuitive grasp for them to
function in extending our knowledge to things which we cannot bring into intuitive grasp.145
Insight into these knowledge advancing relations of symbol to symbol and symbol to object are
“logical.”146 The grasping of things like dependency and independency, genus and species (in the
Aristotelian sense of the terms) and the like, are logical insights which hold true to the developed
symbolic forms of representation and to the things themselves. Thus it is true that all knowledge
rests on evidenz but it is not true that all objects of knowledge must be brought into a mental act
as an epistemologically immanent object (the symbol, under the previously specified guidelines,
is sufficient).147
b. The Knowledge Relationship
It was stated previously that knowledge is the relation between an act in which an object
is not given and an act in which it is either given authentically or through the appropriate symbol.
What was spelled out above was the “appropriateness” of symbolic giving and that something is
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given symbolically does not epistemically demote it; “In the (symbolic) practice of arithmetic
one senses no loss of epistemic status upon abandoning the “numbers themselves” along with
actual operations on them.”148 What remains now is for us to provide a further explication of this
relation.
There are three fundamental components which make this relation possible. The mental
act which intends the object as such, the mental act which contains the intuition of the intended
object (understood as being inclusive of the appropriate symbolic types of givenness dealt with
above), and the mental act which unites these two previous acts. Without the former two the
latter would not be possible but it is the latter act which is referred to as ‘knowing;’ “An act of
knowing consciously incorporates that relation between thought and intuition.”149 In all three of
these acts the selfsame object is the intentional object. The first act intends an object but the
intended object may or may not exist. As we pointed out Husserl’s theory of intentionality
(falling roughly in the adverbial set of theories) allows for the intentional object to not exist. The
thought still has an intentional direction but that “road” may or may not lead anywhere. Thus the
first act stands as an empty intention. The second act involves the ‘givenness’ of the intentional
object which allows for no inexistence of the object. In this case the mental act draws something
(which is often ontologically transcendent) into epistemological immanence. The third act then
relates these two act together. Thus knowledge is a higher order act of cognition, showing that
the empty intuition has found its fulfillment in the latter intuition. Knowledge then for Husserl is
often denoted by the term ‘fulfillment.’150 It is an act distinct from the first two. It has the same
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object as the first two but is related to it in a different way. The first merely intends it, the object,
the second finds it, the third finds it to be as it was intended to be. Willard again beautifully
summarizes this and provides a helpful example:
The fulfillment of the thought – the “knowing” involved – is my
consciousness of this object, the pen in the desk, as being as thought. The thought
or “empty intention” is what is fulfilled, and the intuition is what “gives” the
thought its fulfillment. But fulfillment (knowledge) is still a relation to the object,
even though it rests or is “founded” upon a kind of “gathering up” or “synthesis”
of other cognitive acts directed upon the same object.151
While I used ‘intentional direction’ earlier in order to stay with current terminology it
might be better put ‘intentional velocity.’ Direction tends to mean or imply towards or away
from something. Velocity has speed and direction but it has nothing to do with whether, say an
arrow, will reach any given target or thing whatsoever. Some objects on some velocity simply
will not reach anything at all. Intentionality is the same way. It has a specific type of
intentionality (desiring blue, repulsion at blue, believing in blue, etc.). It also has a certain
direction (in the previous cases all directed at blue). But just as an arrow with a given velocity
imparts no relation to its target so also intentionality has no relation to its target (i.e. the
intentional object). Hence the inexistence of the intentional object is possible (such as is the case
when we believe in Pegasus). But the mental act which has the intentional “velocity” of
believing in and being about Pegasus has those properties (as the arrow with no existing target
has the properties of speed and direction). The knowledge relation on the other hand does have
an actual relation to the object of knowledge (albeit an external relation) hence it allows for no
inexistence of the object. An external relation allows for the relatum to pass in and out of the
relation without losing its identity (e.g. the ball that is hit by a bat).152 In being related to the act
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which takes it as its object, the object of knowledge has a property attributed to it that it did not
have before (i.e. being known by X). And since this object has properties it must exist; “nothing
can have properties and not exist.”153 This provides the basis for a comparison between an act
which merely intends an object and an act which intuits the object. It allows for the “possibility
of comparing object with meaning and of observing the agreement or disagreement between the
conceptualization and its determinatively qualified object.”154
For Husserl, having distinguished between the two types of transcendence/immanence,
there is no real difference between bringing an ontologically transcendent object into intuitive
grasp as opposed to an immanent one. It is simply a question of what one takes as their
intentional object. Hardy says “Transcendence is no longer the problem of reaching out from one
part of the world (the ontologically immanent) to another (the ontologically transcendent), but
the transcendence of a pure consciousness to which both the empirical object and the empirical
subject appear.”155 The backing for this is again by going through the reductions and “seeing”
what happens. Our cognition of intramental events and objects has the same essence as our
cognition of extramental events and objects. The key for Husserl is to bring this essence before
one minds and then recognize it in its instances. “Only if the essence of this relation is
somewhere given to him, so that he could see it, so that the unity of knowing and the known
object, which is suggested by the phrase “making contact with reality” (Triftigkeit), would itself
stand right before his eyes. Then he would have knowledge about its possibility, rather this
possibility would be clearly given to him.”156 The essence of knowledge is revealed and it
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becomes possible for us to recognize its instances. As Willard says “That possibility (The
possibility of knowledge) is just the possibility of the mind fully coming… into direct relation
with what is not a part of, not genuinely (reell) contained in, the relevant acts directed upon
it.”157
c. A Comparison to Kant
Hence Husserl’s criticizes Kant’s attempt to save knowledge because “Kant tried to
“save” knowledge (show that it is possible) before determining what it is, “before subjecting it to
a clarifying critique and analysis of essence.” ”158 Interestingly Kant took an approach similar to
Husserl’s when investigating morality. His Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morality ignores
all human conditions and their relations to morality and seeks to gain a clear view of morality
itself (the essence of morality). The essence of morality must be laid bare and then its connection
and relation to the human condition can be understood. Kant never really questioned whether
morality was possible for humans but he did recognize that one must get a grip on morality itself
first. Surely we can say that just as contingent human factors may change the way morality is
applied (something Kant deals with in The Metaphysics of Morals) these contingent factors could
also make morality impossible or inapplicable for humans (as Kant would admit to be the case if
all Humans were arrational sponges or something of the sort).
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Kant, at least attempted, to get clear on the essence of morality before proceeding to
human morality.159 In relation to knowledge though he did not properly “reduce” the question,
seeking to get a grip on knowledge itself (i.e. the essence of knowledge, and come to terms with
the methodology one must embrace to do so).
“The question that initially drove us is also reduced… not how can I, this
person, in my experiences, make contact with a being in itself, something that
exists out there, outside of me; in place of this question… we have now a pure
basic question: how can the pure phenomenon of knowledge make contact with
something that is not immanent to it how can the absolute self-givenness of
knowledge make contact with something that is not self-given, and how is this
contact to be understood?”160
All attempts, such as Kant’s, Frege’s, and what seems to have become the analytic
tradition (they all start from a postulation of what must be in place and are tied to the process of
explanation) to account for knowledge are doomed to fail from the outset. This stems from what
we pointed out above is a mistaken μεταβασι. “If this shifting (shifting to a false μεταβασι) is
to be avoided, and we are to remain focused on the sense of the question concerning this
possibility, the phenomenological reduction is required.”161
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Then, to proceed further with the investigation, one must vary the objects and hold steady other aspects of the acts
directed upon them. One goes through the whole range of possible variations of mental acts and their objects. In this
way the complex and rich nature of intentionality, and of the corresponding mental acts of all types, with their
intentional properties, can be made to stand out before the reflexive consciousness, and systematic descriptions can
be developed. That is exactly the mode of research developed by Edmund Husserl. He eventually called it
"Phenomenology," and held that the overall theme of Phenomenology is intentionality.” Dallas Willard,
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B. Conclusion
Husserl then has given us a description of the essence of knowledge. A description of
what it would mean for God, angels, hippos or humans to know something. This provides us
with an account of the possibility of knowledge. And by the phenomenological method we can
“see” it take place in our own consciousness. That shows that knowledge is actual in human life.
That things can come before our mind and we can grasp them. And so “Exactly what recourse do
we have but: “Zu dem Sachen selbst (to the things themselves)!”162 Lee Hardy summarizes
Husserl approach to the problem of knowledge as dealing with the possibility of transcendence
and the problem concerning correspondence. 163 The first is solved by means of a theory of
intentionality and the second is solved by the phenomenological approach which allows for
“seeing” and the higher order act of synthesis between a merely intentional act and the intuition
which stand as its fulfillment. What remains now is for us to apply Husserl’s theory to the
current discussion of epistemology.
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IV. HUSSERL, WILLARD, AND THE CURRENT DISCUSSION
A. Investigation of Noetic Conditions as Opposed to a Definitional Approach
We noted above that Husserl’s emphasis was on the question concerning the possibility
of knowledge and not on listing the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge that
characterize current epistemology. Willard followed suit in this regards. His oft made claim that
Knowledge is “the capacity to represent a respective subject matter as it is on an appropriate
basis of thought and/or experience” leaves out entirely the fine points of “appropriateness” that
are the major and fundamental concerns of current epistemology.164 He also went on to say that:
What constitutes an “appropriate basis” will vary from subject matter to
subject matter, of course, as is generally acknowledged of the corresponding
methods of inquiry. It is, no doubt, impossible to define “appropriate basis” in any
perfectly general way, or even to specify perfectly general necessary and
sufficient conditions for having an appropriate basis. Certainly I will make no
attempt to do so here. However, a few things may be said about the necessary
conditions of knowledge and knowing, without attempting to be definitional or
even comprehensive. 165
Both Husserl and Willard were more concerned about responding to and refuting views
which undermined certain necessary conditions of knowledge than with offering a definition of
knowledge itself. (Willard’s remark above that he “would not do so here” seems to hold for all of
his work; it just wasn’t something he was concerned with.) Both of them were concerned with
rebutting the claims of the naturalistic and relativistic views of their time. For Husserl this was
primarily in regards to psychologism and the atheistic naturalism which developed into logical
positivism. For Willard it was in regards to the various forms of naturalism and scientism (both
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of which were strongly connected to the logical positivist movement which developed during
Husserl’s life).166 Though neither of them were concerned with such definitional work it does not
seem that they were necessarily opposed to it either (though we will have to make some
allowances for both of their discussions on noetic structures). Willard’s quote above may make it
seem like he was opposed to trying to flesh out necessary and sufficient conditions but two
things must be understood about this quote.
First of all though he did not hold the full listing of the necessary and sufficient
conditions needed for a “definition” of knowledge to be possible this does not mean that
discussion on such things are not worthwhile or that progress cannot be made in discussing them.
Part of both Husserl’s and Willard’s concern with current epistemology (in their own respective
times) was that it was starting on the false μεταβασι discussed above and that it overlooked the
question concerning the possibility of knowledge. What was necessary for real progress to be
made was to start from the right questions and develop the correct methodology based off of and
necessitated by this fundamental question and then to proceed from there. To start with a list of
the necessary and sufficient conditions and proceed to testing it with barn facades, clocks, and
beliefs in other minds, is, at least it was to them, to overlook the most important aspects of
knowledge and doom oneself to making no real substantial progress.
Second, the important role of the noesis developed above takes place within a complex
and “messy” “web of life.”167 A helpful example here is what often transpires when attempting to
teach logic. One can explain the principles of inference and modus ponens and one student “gets
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it” and another does not. One tries example after example and then suddenly, there it is, it
“clicks.” The concept is understood. The student knows and can represent modus ponens on an
appropriate basis. But what one student needed to noetically “connect the dots,” to be lead to the
universal concept, is different from the other (i.e. the noetic conditions upon which they come to
understand the concept are different). Why did one student get it early on but not the other? A
spelling out of the sufficient conditions for an “appropriate basis” would have to offer an
explanation here.
Certainly a spelling out of all the “appropriate” noetic conditions for which one could
come to know something as simple as modus ponens is out of reach. It seems, furthermore, like
even developing a general heading under which they could all fit (so that one could say “If one
has noetic conditions of type X then one knows modus ponens”) is also unattainable. Willard
points out that the very noetic structures of creative genius, as exemplified in persons like
Einstein, just seem fundamentally out of our reach in terms of our ability to explain and
categorize. “This (inability), I believe, is why it is impossible to lay down general sufficient
conditions of an “appropriate basis.” ”168 But this does not imply that discussions of noetic
structures are to be avoided all together or that they are all entirely in vain. Willard would only
seem to be against attempts to fit noetic structures into a box, so to speak. Now this, it seems, is
exactly what is going on in much of current epistemology. Trying to formulate criteria for which
all noetic structures must fall under (consider that theories of epistemology are normative
concerning noetic structures). Alvin Plantinga points out that this judging of noetic structures is
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the case for foundationalism.169 Willard concurred with Plantinga’s statement and extended it to
“the many versions of coherentism, verificationism, Aufbau projects, social constructionism,
externalism, internalism, and “linguistic rule” theories.”170 The assumption is that we all want to
be and ought to be rational (I’m not here challenging this assumption, just drawing attention to
it). And these theories flesh out the conditions for rational belief. Thus much of the normative
discussion is perhaps obscured under talk of rationality.171 The normative aspect though in
contemporary discussions are about specifying the conditions for which all noetic structures
ought to fall under.
B. HW and Reformed Epistemology
The outlier in this regards in the current discussion is reformed epistemology. Reformed
epistemology rejects normative noetic structures which reject belief in God as properly basic but,
(and most important to the current discussion) it makes no attempt to offer a replacement
criterion. (Reformed epistemology does not reject normative noetic structures entirely though.
Hence they are an outlier but only in the sense of defining the conditions for a normative noetic
structure) Plantinga helpfully points this out by comparing the Reformed epistemologist to the
person who rejects the positivist’s verification criterion for meaningfulness without offering a
replacement formula.172 It is important to note that Plantinga shows that this does not commit the
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Reformed epistemologist to accepting any belief as basic or (in line with our current discussion)
any noetic structure as normatively in the clear (i.e. rational).173
So where does this leave us? Plantinga’s view is that rational noetic structures are to be
advanced not by a universal statement which captures all rational structures of belief (again
given what said above concerning Einstein and creative genius how could we?) but by
induction.174 His view is that progress is to be made from “below rather than from above.”175
What he means is that we start with beliefs that we are rational in holding and find other beliefs
that are similar to them, accepting them as rationally in the clear, and reject other beliefs which
are dissimilar on that basis (though they may be rationally supported by some other process).
This seems to get us on the right track and is perfectly consistent with Husserl and Willard. What
phenomenology offers us though is a science of analyzing those specific noetic structures and a
means of grasping their essence. This is a “below” method since it starts with an investigation of
mental acts, their objects, essences, etc. The phenomenological method offers deep going
cognitive analysis which supplements the inductive method proposed by Plantinga.
C. Opposition to HW’s compatibility with Externalism
1. Introduction
Now the point just developed shows that Husserl and Willard are compatible with certain
forms of externalism (though not forms of externalism which seek to have a corner on the market
concerning noetic structures). But it is commonly held that both Willard and Husserl are firmly
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entrenched internalists.176 This claim will be challenged on two lines, the first is that the
lingocentric process of justification in most internalist theories is incompatible with Husserl and
Willard's approach. And the second is that a clearer understanding of intentionality for Husserl
and Willard, and the development of an intentionality threshold, both open Willard and Husserl
to externalist theories.
2. Lingocentric Justification
“True opinions are a fine thing and do all sorts of good so long as they
stay in their place, but they will not stay long. They run away from a man’s mind;
so they are not worth much until you tether them by working out the reason….
Once they are tied down, they become knowledge, and are stable. That is why
knowledge is something more valuable than right opinion. What distinguishes one
from the other is the tether.” Plato177
Phillip Olsen rightly points out that what makes up this tether (the listing of the necessary
and sufficient conditions for it) is much debated but that articulate reflection is one of the
necessary materials for the classic internalist.178 By ‘articulate reflection’ Olsen means “the
ability to provide reasons for believing the things one rightly believes.”179 In current philosophy
the providing of reasons has been closely linked to the ability to provide a linguistical framework
(both in one’s own mind and so naturally in speech as well) which explains those reasons. Hence
Olsen sees it fit to substitute ‘articulate reflection’ for “the ability to provide reasons for
believing the things one rightly believes.” The linguistical component is at least implied, and
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perhaps required by, the ability to provide the reasons. In the case of chicken sexers (supposed
persons who can tell the sex of chicken that will hatch from an egg) Olsen says “The conditions
that make the chicken sexer’s skill possible and successful remain mysterious and inarticulate—
in the sense that the chicken sexer cannot ‘‘state’’ or ‘‘express’’ her reasons for judging that a
particular chick is male or female.”180 And again note the emphasis on a linguistical foundation:
“If the skill were to become articulate, if chicken sexers were able to explain the principles
according to which their skill operate, the value of the skill might increase as its usefulness in
practices, inquires, and activities other (emphasis in original) than chicken sexing becomes
apparent.”181 Similarly what Plantinga and other reformed epistemologists reject is that they need
to provide some sort of explanation, some stated criteria, for why belief in God is properly basic
and belief in the Great Pumpkin and other such things are not. Olsen’s article deals with a vast
range of authors and it is worth reading to see that the common (but rarely explicitly expressed)
view is that if something is not or was not a linguistical mental act then it fails to provide an
appropriate basis for being a reason. Hookway’s division between inquiry and knowledge is
linguistical; Sosa’s division between knowing and knowing full-well and Zagzebski’s division
between higher and lower knowledge are both linguistical; Code’s comments on understanding
and knowledge also imply a linguistical division.182
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This emphasis on articulate reflection is connected to what has become the standard view
in contemporary philosophy: thought or reasoning is linguistical.183 Hence what is internal to the
knower (open to her consciousness) must be linguistical. To suppose that she has justification is
to imply that she can articulately reflect. To say that something is external to her seems to mean
that it is not on or open to her linguistical/conscious radar. So to the extent to which one would
reject the requirement of articulate reflection for knowledge then one would be categorized an
externalist and to the extent that they would accept it, they would be an internalist.184 Because of
Husserl and Willard’s insistence on the openness to consciousness of one’s “tether” for
knowledge it is assumed that they are internalist in a fairly standard sense. However, there is a
strong rejection of this lingocentric model in Husserl (which was adopted and heavily
emphasized by Willard). This in turn opens them up to some forms of externalism.
Perhaps the best example here is in regards to Plantinga and the sensus divinitatis.185
Plantinga says the sensus divinitatis is something which “in a wide variety of circumstances
produces in us beliefs about God.”186 This is widely considered to be an externalist theory due to
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its rejection of any need to provide articulate reflection or meet the classic evidentialist’s
standards of basicality. However, this theory is not out of place in a Husserlian/Willardarian
(HW) model. Plantinga himself compares this type of belief formation to that of beliefs
concerning logic, specifically modus ponens.187 What the phenomenologist has to offer here
(once again) is a way of reflecting on this process of belief formation that can draw it into
clarification. Just as Husserl and Willard held that there is a type of eidetic blindness there may
also be type of spiritual blindness (as Calvin, Aquinas, and Plantinga have all seemed to argue).
This does not mean that a HW approach implies or is implied by Plantinga’s theory but only that
it is compatible with it. Husserl’s statements on belief formation in logic, specifically the
essential mental acts and relations which represent them, and Plantinga’s statements on logic and
belief in God display this common thread.188 For believers in God it might just be that there our
symbolic situations (e.g. the contemplation of the starry heavens or the moral law within) which
can lead to the appropriate grasp of the existence of God and provide a proper foundation for
belief in him.
Now one objection here that should be dealt with is that Husserl’s insistence on the
understanding of methods which lead us to truth through phenomenological insight to be had in
order for those methods to produce knowledge.189 Let us quote Husserl at length to best
understand his position here.
Following such a path of insight, and with constant reference to the
peculiarities of our mental constitution, the pioneers of research discover methods
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which they justify once and for all. When this has been done, such methods can
be used without insight, so to say mechanically, in each given case: an objectively
correct result is assured. This far-reaching reduction of insight to mechanism in
our thought-processes leads to an indirect mastery over those endlessly winding
paths of thought that admit of no direct mastery: such a reduction rests on the
psychological nature of signitive-symbolic thinking. It plays an immeasurable role
in the construction of blind mechanisms, e.g. the rules for the four arithmetical
Operations, and for higher operations with decimals, where a result emerges,
perhaps with the help of logarithmic or geometric functional tables, but without
assistance from insight. But it also plays a part in contexts where insight guides
our researches and our proofs…These surrogative, operational concepts which
turn signs into a kind of counters, preside exclusively over the most extensive
fields of arithmetical thought and research. They represent a vast easing of the
latter, they take them down from the exhausting heights of abstraction to
comfortable, intuitive ways, where imagination, guided by insight, can move,
within the limits of rules, with freedom and with relative effortlessness, as in
regulated games. One should point, in this connection, to the revolutionary
thought-economy which occurs in the purely mathematical disciplines, when
genuine thought is replaced by surrogative, signitive thinking, an economy which
leads imperceptibly to formal generalizations of our original thought-trains, and
even of our sciences. In this manner, almost without specially directed mental
labour, deductive disciplines arise having an infinitely enlarged horizon. Out of
arithmetic, the original theory of numbers and numerical magnitudes, a
generalized, formal arithmetic arises in more or less spontaneous fashion: in this
numbers and magnitudes no longer count as basic concepts, but in this numbers
and magnitudes no longer count as basic concepts, but merely as chance objects
of application. Fully conscious reflection now takes over, and the pure theory of
manifolds emerges as a further extension. In its form this covers all possible
deductive systems: the form-system of formal arithmetic is merely one of its
special instances.
To analyse these and like types of method, and fully to clarify their
achievement, is perhaps the most beautiful and least developed field in the theory
of science, the extremely important, instructive theory of deductive method (of
mathematical method in the widest sense). We do not of course get to do this
through mere generalities, through vague talk of the surrogative function of signs,
of mechanisms which save energy etc.: deep-going analyses are everywhere
needed.190
What this quotation shows is that Husserl held that mathematical and other similar types
of symbolic thinking, such as logic, are developed (that is they actually have historically
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developed this way) by insight, “seeing.” Hence they do produce knowledge. What was lacking
was a clarification of how these types of research do so. It was this task of clarification which
Husserl set out to do in the “Philosophy of Arithmetic.” It was not the case that insight was
lacking in the field of mathematics but that insight into this insight was lacking. Tied to this point
is that Willard points out that on a Husserlian framework you can know x without knowing that
you know x.191 Hence, insight into God’s existence can be achieved for some without insight into
this insight.192 This would just make belief in God just one of the many areas where “deep-going
analysis” is needed. Just like the mathematician could “see” certain deductive relations and
proceed from this genuine insight without insight into the nature of this “seeing” so belief in God
can proceed the same way. And it would be a mistake, on the basis of a lack of insight into
insight (or knowing how you know that) to disregard the belief on that basis.
What Husserl is concerned with excluding as knowledge is people who are, for example,
told to write down certain numbers and symbols and then perform mathematical operations but
have no understanding of what anything means or why they are doing it, regardless of the
reliability of their operations. Perhaps a good example here is where certain formulas are
memorized when learning algebra but no explanation is given as to what they mean, what they
stand for, why they work, etc. This aspect of Husserl’s thought would certainly cause tension
between Husserl and some externalist theories (particularly naturalistic ones, which claim
reliability alone to be sufficient for knowledge). But I see no point of contention here between
Husserl and Plantinga but rather great concord. Plantinga requires a certain “maturity” for the
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sensus divinitatis to work and again compares it with arithmetical knowledge. The objection that
HW is necessarily opposed to all aspects of externalism then is unfounded and rests on a
confusion between insight and insight into types of insight.
Lastly, this again shows the disconnect between articulate reflection and the HW model.
Just as the small child may have real insight into why 2+2=4 but not be able to adequately
articulate it, especially if we raise questions concerning his use not of the numbers themselves
but of symbols (i.e. ‘2’, ‘+’, ‘=’ and ‘4’), so in other areas of knowledge where it is based on real
insight there need not be any reliance upon some standard of articulation.
3. Intentionality and the Intentionality Threshold
The second challenge to HW being incompatible with aspects of certain externalist
theories centers on the theory of intentionality it employs. The error being addressed here largely
stems from Heidegger’s criticism of Husserl. A criticism which was influential to the
existentialism of Heidegger, Sartre and others. To begin with it is helpful to look at Heidegger
and his theory of intentionality.
Heidegger saw Husserl as standing at the head of a long line of philosophy which went
back to Descartes, where the ego is a “spectator.” 193 Heidegger’s theory of intentionality must
be first and foremost be seen as a reaction against the Cartesian mode of thinking which
considers man as basically a subject contemplating objects.194 Primarily, both in terms of that
which is most foundational and that which is most common, humans are not beings which
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analyze things, like hammers, but beings which simply are thrown into the world, Geworfenheit,
and then function in that environment (often without being conscious of how one functions in
such a way). 195 This is to say they exist and function without being subjects contemplating
objects. In contemplating objects subjects have an intentional direction towards them. So for
Heidegger persons fundamentally exist: unintentionally, merely using or coping with objects.
As Hubert Dreyfus points out, this basic and unintentional way of living is “so pervasive
and constant that he (Heidegger) simply calls it being-in-the-world.”196 This sub-intentional
coping is the standard modus operandi and the most basic way of being, from which all other
forms arise. Individuals remain in this mode unless they encounter some sort of difficulty (e.g. a
door handle not working). Upon such an encounter a person then become intentional and
functions along the lines of the Cartesian paradigm, as a thinking subjects contemplating objects
(that is to say, they become intentional). Dreyfus and Heidegger both agree that as the skill of the
person increases in regards to the situation they are in they become less and less likely to rise to
the intentional level.197 This lack of intentionality because of the presence of skill (as opposed to
the mere lack of problems) is called skilled coping.198 The threshold for shifting from
unintentional to intentional being, which is a combination of both the difficulty of the event and
the skill of the agent, I shall call the threshold of intentionality (All actions then will either fall
above this line, thus being intentional, or fall below it, thus being unintentional, for Heidegger at
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least.). What is of note here is that for Heidegger the primary, the basic way, of being in the
world is an unintentional one. For Husserl it is intentional.
The relevancy of this to our current discussion is that it makes Husserl appear to be
someone who is committed to the view that the reasons for our beliefs and actions are something
for which we are consciously aware of all the time. This would again lend itself to Husserl being
labeled an internalist of sorts. (Which is of course against our thesis that HW has application to
both sides of the current discussion which puts it in a unique position to combine insights from
both internalism and externalism.) There are two problems with arguing from this view of
Husserl’s theory of intentionality to internalism.
a. Problem One: Non-Linguistic Intentionality
Along the lines of the previous section, there is a great divorce between Husserl and
current lingocentric models of thought. Just because we are aware of objects and have an
intentionality which is related to them in some way (this “related to them in some way” will be
flushed out more fully shortly) it does not mean that we have or experience some mental
articulation of them. Consciousness just is not inherently articulate. Hence there can always be a
breakdown between what we are aware of (what is open to us in an act of intuition or being used
in symbolic representation) and what we can articulate (what we can bring into articulate
reflection). This was precisely what was going on in the case concerning mathematics, dealt with
in detail above. There was real insight into the nature of mathematics but there was a lack of
insight into how this insight was brought about. So while there was knowledge being advanced
there was not an understanding of how that knowledge was being advanced (This lack of a
higher order knowledge clearly necessitated that there be a lack in articulate reflection). Husserl
clearly was not attempting to advance knowledge of mathematics in the usual sense (by coming
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up with new mathematical theories). He was concerned with developing a metamathematical
theory (i.e. with providing an account of the advancement of knowledge in mathematics).
There is also “(a) “marginal” type of subordinate awareness.”199 Willard’s example is of
our awareness of the letters and symbols on a page.200 The letters and symbols are objects, they
have properties, we use them, our intentions are placed on them, but they are not the objects of
our intentions. This draws us back to the confusion brought about by the “common assumption,”
that if noemata are objects they are the objects of our intentions. This assumption is false. They
are objects but they are not the objects of our intentions. Yet they nevertheless “bear” our
intentions (i.e. they are part of the intentional stream). These subordinate objects (such as the
letters on a page) then bear intentionality in a way analogous to neomata. The problem is that the
common assumption holds that if something, some object, bears intentionality, then it is the
intentional object (this is a more general statement of the common assumption given earlier,
earlier it was limited only to noemata). And the intentional object is something which we are
aware of in the fullest sense, not in a “marginal” or “subordinate” way. Hence for Heidegger
(since he sees no subordinate type of awareness and represents the more common view of an
intentional beam) there must be a very large extent to which we are not intentional at all. This is
because the objects we are using, in many cases, are not the intentional object and we are not
fully aware of them. Husserl would agree that we are always fully aware (i.e. never marginally
aware) of the intentional object but that the common assumption overlooks the vast complexity
of intentionality. Hence there are many objects which bear intentionality in any one act. There is
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only one intentional object but many of the subordinate or marginal type. Intentionality is not a
laser like beam but a vast streaming web of intentionality.
Now if there can be a breakdown between what is going on in mental acts which have
real insight into the intentional objects of mental acts and our explanation of these acts, as was
the case in mathematics, then surely it seems there would be a similar division between objects
which are subordinate and our ability to provide an explanation of them. Thus, both the
intentional objects and subordinate objects can be things which we are aware of (are intentional
about in either the full sense or the subordinate sense) but this does not require that we have
articulate reflection concerning them (this is doubly so for the marginal or subordinate objects).
I am not here arguing that Husserl’s account of intentionality is better than Heidegger’s but only
that a strict internalism does not necessarily follow from Husserl’s view.
b. Problem Two: The intentionality Threshold
There is a further way in which Husserl’s theory can be divorced from necessitating a
fairly traditional form of internalism. The previous section dealt with a specific aspects of
Husserl’s theory (its non-lingocentrism and its complex view on intentionality), which offered
some distance between it and many contemporary models of internalism. This section deals with
the setting of the intentionality threshold (something which as far as the author is aware is not a
part of Husserl’s theory) and how this setting is compatible with HW. However, one’s view of
how it ought to be set can alter, without losing compatibility to HW, and subsequently allow for
one’s theory to be more internalist or externalist.
We made reference above to what we called “the intentionality threshold” let us now
develop this idea more fully. We noted that for Heidegger the threshold delineates the shift from
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a non-intentional state to an intentional one. For Husserl this threshold would delineate intentions
which are “marginal” (and so “marginally” aware of them) from intentional states which are the
full focus of our consciousness. Let us call the type of intentions that fall above this threshold
(the intentions which are not marginal) first order intentionality. And let us call the type of
intentions which fall below it second order intentionality. So, for example, when I awake in the
morning and decide to get out of bed I have a first order intentionality towards the state of affairs
“my being out of bed.” But some of the actions I make and their corresponding states of affairs
(such as pulling at the covers and “not having the covers on me”) represent a second order
intentionality.201
Now the question that most concerns us here is “What determines the intentionality
threshold, i.e. what determines whether I rise to first order intentionality or not?” For Heidegger
the setting of the threshold was not something determined by the intentions of the agent. But
rather by the circumstances the agent found themselves in. For Husserl though the setting of this
threshold must be intentional. While Husserl’s view does not exclude factors external to the
agent’s intentions from playing a role, such as skill (skill in the broad sense of the term which
would include things like intelligence, coordination, strength, etc.) or environmental concerns,
(e.g. difficulties due to the physical surroundings), the interference of other agents, etc., the
fundamental setting of the threshold must be something set by the agent. Otherwise Husserl’s
theory would at bottom be the same as Heidegger’s where intentionality is not the most basic

There are similar parallels to this development in Searle’s work which are attempted to be dealt with by
Dreyfus. See Hubert Dreyfus, "Heidegger's Critique of the Husserl/Searle Account of Intentionality." Particularly
Searle’s skier example ibid., 30.
201
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form of existence in the world.202 The intentionality threshold is set intentionally then for
Husserl. Two questions remain “Is the threshold set with a first order intentionality or a second
order intentionality?” and “How ought it to be set?”
i. How the Threshold is Set
In regards to the first question, “Is the intentionality threshold set by a first or second
order intention?” by means of a first order intention seems to be the correct answer to me. The
answer to the question hinges on how one interprets the mental acts which have (as one of their
parts) the setting of the threshold. Let us take tying one’s shoes for an example. This is
something that we all start out unable to do and then, hopefully, learn to do. While in the process
of learning we intend to tie our shoes. And these early attempts are certainly at the first order
level of intentionality. Now though we tie our shoes “automatically,” “without thinking about it.”
Most of us probably cannot recall an instance where we entertained and intended (first order) the
thought “I’m not going to pay attention to tying my shoes anymore.” At first the lack of this
specific thought process might seem to indicate that the threshold is set by a side-effect of what
we repeatedly intend on the first order level (thus becoming something which is “marginal” in
our mental acts and so correspond to the second order level of intentionality). However, I think
what might be our initial interpretation of this process is incorrect. What we are really intending
in the beginning of these processes, like our example of shoe tying, is not “to tie our shoes” but
“to learn to tie our shoes.” (The language above actually reflects this to some extent: “in the

Unfortunately whether Husserl or Heiddeger’s theory is better equipped to explain our own nature and
our experiences of the world is something which lies outside of the domain of this paper. I should like to point out
that I think Heidegger’s view will have problems when it comes to moral experiences and that it goes against what
we experience about how we live and grow in the world. As far back as we can go in our minds we see ourselves
able to do things, follow complex patterns of thought, focus on things, etc., on the second order level of
intentionality only after we have devoted a significant amount of time on the first order level trying to do it, follow
the train of thought, not be distracted, etc.
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process of learning to tie our shoes.”) This is to become shoetiers, persons who readily and
easily tie shoes. And of course we realize that tying our shoes today and tomorrow, and so forth,
is the means to our end. And intending to be shoetiers does not force us to hold that we never
intend here and now to tie our shoes on the first order level (especially not while we are learning
to tie them). But since we did first order intend to become shoetiers then upon becoming capable
at tying our shoes we began to do this process on a second order level. The setting of the
threshold then corresponds to the initial intention, first order intention to become shoetiers, and is
so set by first order intentions.
ii. How Should the Threshold be Set?
Now one of the implications of the fact that the threshold is set intentionally is that it can
be set correctly or incorrectly. To change examples, a person may go through the same process
as the boy who learns to tie his shoes in learning to drive. And many intend to become capable
drivers (persons who naturally and easily drive well). But because of pride, laziness,
inobservance, etc., one may falsely take it to be the case that one is a capable driver. This hasty
conclusion can, nevertheless, result in a shift at the intentionality threshold. Here we must
remember Husserl’s account of knowledge given above and the concept of fulfillment. The
situation which stood as a possible fulfillment for some person’s intentions, call him Jack, was
his actually being a capable driver. And fulfillment of that intention is brought about when he
finds himself to be as he intended. This is a direct parallel to Husserl’s account of knowledge. If
Jack allows desire to outrun knowledge then he will take what is not a case of fulfillment to be
an actual case of fulfillment. He will then begin to function below the threshold when driving.
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This is a development of Willard’s claim that one of the dangers in human life is that our lives
will run off of desire rather than knowledge.203
The development of the intentionality threshold given has considered actions as opposed
to beliefs (this was done because it seems easiest to understand in regards to actions). But the
threshold is equally applicable to belief. In fact, no strong delineation should be made between
its application in regards to action as opposed to belief. The strong connection between the
thresholds application to action and belief and the parallels that we saw with Husserl’s theory of
knowledge is precisely because of the strong connection between belief and action. As Willard
says “Belief is the rails upon which our life runs.”204 And since the threshold is partially set on
the basis of our beliefs (e.g. if we believe we are competent drivers then we will allow for certain
actions to fall below the threshold) then we have a responsibility to ensure that our beliefs are
based off of real insight rather than desire. As Willard says, “All of us bear a primary ethical
responsibility to make sure that how we are speaking and thinking of things is as they are, that is
that our thoughts and words are true.”205 All of this reinforces the normative aspect of the setting
of the intentionality threshold but it does not answer the question of how it ought to be set.
Husserl recognized that we often do not carry our thoughts through to a pure act of
“seeing” but we assure ourselves, sometimes wrongly, that we could do so.206 At this point we
should clearly get before our minds Husserl’s theory concerning knowledge and quoting Willard

See Dallas Willard, “The Genius of Jesus,” lecture given at Veritas Forum (Ohio State University 2002),
7:30ff (particularly the comments around the 10:40 mark). This lecture is available for free at
http://www.learnoutloud.com/Catalog/Religion-and-Spirituality/Christianity/The-Genius-of-Jesus/22208
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Ibid., 6:58.
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Dallas Willard, “Knowledge and Naturalism,” 34.
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Dallas Willard, “Knowledge,” 153.
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is very helpful in this regard. “In the dispositional sense we “have” knowledge, are
knowledgeable, when we are in a position or are qualified to actualize the path toward the recognitive union of concept and object through perception (read as “an act of “seeing” ”) when we
choose.”207 The intentionality threshold deals with this exact issue of how often should we
“carry through to a pure act of perception” (that is how often we are supposed to re-actualize the
path toward cognitive union). It is important to notice that knowledge is independent of this reactualization (and this independence alone makes HW more compatible with externalist theories
than is normally thought).
However, it should be noted that if the threshold is set too high, resulting in us being
second order intentional more often then we ought to be, this will result in our never actualizing
the union in the first place (such was the case in our example with Jack and becoming a
competent driver). Therefore no matter how reliable one might be if there is never a point where
fulfillment is actually brought about in act of “seeing” then one does not have knowledge. So
while HW would be compatible with certain externalist theories it would not be compatible with
a strict reliabilism like Goldman’s. Setting the threshold correctly makes sure that the union is
actualized in the first place (without going so far as to require re-actualization of the union in
every case). Furthermore, how one holds that the threshold ought to be set in order to have
knowledge will determine how internalist or externalist one is. The specific level of the threshold
is not something that Husserl or Willard seem to address. HW then is compatible with different
interpretations of how the threshold ought to be set.
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Ibid., 152.
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D. Conclusion
HW then is not strictly an internalist theory. It is open to certain externalist insights, such
as Plantinga’s sensus divinitatis and HW shows a marked difference between it and the current
lingocentrism of contemporary theories. Furthermore, marginal intentions and the intentionality
threshold allow for a range of externalist or internalist theories to be accommodated by HW.
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V. Closing
A. Additional Insight Needed in Understanding Phenomenology
The full application of Husserl’s theory and Willard’s understanding and application of it
to the current state of affairs in epistemology has not been considered. This has been more of an
introduction to and explanation of their theory and an argument for its application to the current
situation in epistemology. This thesis has also tried to address the concern that HW is only
compatible with internalist theories. Such a view would make HW single sided to its application
in the current discussion and it would, at minimal, make it less likely to provide insight going
forward in the internalist-externalist discussion. HW, however, has a far broader application than
that. Much more remains to be explored though in discussing HW and its application to current
epistemology. The theory and implications of proximate and ultimate fulfillment has been
largely untouched here in this paper. Also HW’s emphasis on the importance of noetic structures
(which opens it up to some coherentist insights) has not been addressed. Husserl’s alignment
with Aristotle in that knowledge is always of essences has been largely untouched. Much more
can and needs to be explored on the phenomenological side of this discussion.
B. Additional Insight Needed in Applying Phenomenology
Also much more needs to be said in applying phenomenology to current epistemology
and reorienting the current discussion around phenomenology; nothing has been said here in this
paper regarding Gettier problems or any other problem in current epistemology. However, a
reorienting of epistemology around phenomenological insight does not require a total dismissal
of all the work done thus far nor does it promise to assuage all of the current problems (it is
helpful here to be reminded of Willard’s pessimism concerning a full definition of knowledge).
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Perhaps things like Gettier cases are reminders of this human limitation or perhaps
Phenomenology will provide much needed insight here (please understand this “or” inclusively).
The change in epistemology argued for here is meant to be like a blanket of snow falling over a
vast landscape. Everything is changed but much remains fundamentally the same. The same
deep valleys and peaks still remain and are recognizable. Perhaps some peaks will now be even
harder to climb. And perhaps some lakes easier to traverse. I expect many of the same epistemic
puzzles will remain. Gettier problems and many other familiar faces from the world of epistemic
troubles (Hopefully Davidson’s Swampman is cordial) re-emerge albeit in a different context (a
phenomenological one and one in which we are armed with the additional tools of evidenz,
“seeing,” the reductions, and important distinctions between types of immanence and
clarification and explanation). Husserl did not see himself as putting an end to all of the
questions but of offering a way forward in exploring “beautiful” and underdeveloped theories
where “deep-going analysis is needed everywhere.”208
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